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Summary: There can be no doubt about the dominance of conflict as a concern in modern 
security analysis and policy. Localized and active conflicts have attracted proportionately 
much greater attention since the ending of the East-West Cold War and, with it, of the 
essentially static military confrontation in Europe that had carried the potential for global 
annihilation. They produce more shock and shame, as well as concern, in the onlooker 
because they appear as exceptions to the trend of stabilization in inter-state and inter-
regional relations since 1990 and as a reversion to “pre-modern” methods of behaving in 
the global society. They carry more complicated material implications for non-combatant 
states because of the generally increasing interdependence and “globalization” of the world 
economy 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Interestingly enough, the word “conflict” does not appear in the Charter of the United 
Nations. Instead – and understandably given the time of its genesis - the text refers to 
“disputes”, “aggression” and protecting the world’s peoples from the threat of “war”. If the 
terminology of “conflict” has come largely to replace, and certainly to overshadow, these 
earlier concepts during the later half of the 20th century, it is because it can so conveniently 
be used to encompass a number of different types and sources of armed violence. 
“Conflict” may occur between states, within states and between non-state actors; it can 
involve forces acting on their own territory, or far away; it does not have to have a single 
identified “aggressor”, or to be aimed at physical “conquest”, or to be preceded by a single 
identifiable “dispute” in other form. Elastic though the term is, however, it will be used in 
what follows with some fundamental restrictions. The qualifier “armed” means that we are 
talking here about violence that uses weapons against the life and limb of the opponent, 
and that takes place at some level above the purely personal, domestic, and criminal. There 
is nothing wrong in talking about economic, social, religious or philosophical “conflict”, 
but these other manifestations of human disunity are relevant to the present study only if or 
when they trigger an armed confrontation on a more than individual scale. 
 
There can be no doubt about the dominance of conflict as a concern in modern security 
analysis and policy. Localized and active conflicts have attracted proportionately much 
greater attention since the ending of the East-West Cold War and, with it, of the essentially 
static military confrontation in Europe that had carried the potential for global annihilation.  
They produce more shock and shame, as well as concern, in the onlooker because they 
appear as exceptions to the trend of stabilization in inter-state and inter-regional relations 
since 1990 and as a reversion to “pre-modern” methods of behaving in the global society. 
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1 The analysis in this paper draws heavily on the chapters relating to conflict and conflict management in 
‘SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security’ (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004). Thanks are due to the SIPRI editing staff and to Dr Renata Dwan, head of the SIPRI armed 
conflict and conflict management programme, for permitting the use of this material. 
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They carry more complicated material implications for non-combatant states because of 
the generally increasing interdependence and “globalization” of the world economy.  The 
Security Strategy document “A Secure Europe in a Better World” adopted by the leaders 
of the European Union (EU) at the end of 2003 provides an unusually forthright statement 
of how developed states in one area of the world view the resulting challenges for 
themselves. After pointing out that conflicts since 1990 have killed nearly 4 million people 
worldwide and rendered 18 million homeless, the Strategy argues that developing nations 
can all too easily get trapped in a cycle of “conflict, insecurity and poverty”. “Conflict can 
lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organized 
crime… Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD)”.2 In short, the Europeans would argue that the new security agenda focussed on 
the “asymmetrical threats” of trans-national terrorism and WMD proliferation, which the 
USA has been promoting since the attacks it suffered on 11 September 2001, should not 
displace the issue of conflict from the central place it held in the security preoccupations of 
the 1990’s. Rather, as the Strategy argues, “The most practical way to tackle the often 
elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict”. 
 
While the EU has perhaps been most insistent on keeping conflict issues to the forefront of 
its agenda, every significant international institution that deals with security today has to 
confront the demands of conflict management – and where possible, conflict prevention. 
The report on current security threats and challenges that was commissioned by the UN 
Secretary-General in 2003 from an international High Level Panel, and was published in 
December 20043, devoted some of its most fully-developed and urgent proposals to the 
issues both of intervention and prevention (see further below). Practically every one of the 
agencies in the UN system – notably UNHCR, the UN High Commission on Human 
Rights, FAO, UNICEF, World Bank and UNDP - owes a significant part of its work-load 
to the impact of conflict on societies and individuals. The North Atlantic Alliance has been 
rapidly transforming itself, since 2002 in particular4, to focus on supplying organized 
multilateral forces for conflict missions outside its own area, rather than on Euro-Atlantic 
territorial defence as before.  The handling of “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet space 
and the easing of ethnic tensions and weak-state phenomena that might lead to others are 
set to become the major (and contentious) preoccupations of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  
 
A few of the regional organizations that have been set up in other parts of the world, 
notably the new African Union (AU) and sub-regional African groups like ECOWAS, 
IGAD and SADC – and in a different political setting, the Eurasian security groupings led 
by Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union (currently the Collective Security treaty 
organization, CSTO) – have claimed competence and developed capacity for direct crisis 
interventions, albeit with differing degrees of respectability and success.  Further regional 
organizations in the Asia-Pacific region  (APEC, ARF), in Latin America (Organization of 
                                                 
2 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, adopted by the European Council at Brussels on 12 Dec. 2003, 
available at URL http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/European%20Security%20Strategy.pdf. 
3 ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’ published by the High Level Panel on. 2 Dec. 2004, 
available at  http://www.un.org/secureworld. 
 4
4 NATO agreed on a doctrine of world-wide intervention in mid-2002 and took the required structural and 
capability decisions at the Prague Summit of 21 November that year (including a new Response Force, new 
Capabilities Commitments and the start of a sweeping reform of command structures reform) – see 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm. A more detailed report is in the first chapter (by I. Anthony 
and others) of the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: OUP for 
SIPRI, summer 2003. 
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American States, MERCOSUR and the new South American Community of Nations, 
SACN), and in central Asia (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) have developed joint 
policies in other dimensions of security such as crime, terrorism, proliferation or disaster 
response and may gradually be moving towards addressing (at least) the prevention of 
conflict in their areas more directly. In other dimensions of international cooperation, too, 
the inter-play between conflict and other problems of humanity is being increasingly 
recognized.  There is a renewed debate at inter-state level (notably in the OECD5) about 
the need to explore the deeper causality of conflict and to build the necessary connections 
in this context between the policies/resources addressed to crisis management, 
development assistance, and security sector reform respectively.  A growing range of 
initiatives involving both official and private-sector action have focussed on the links 
between conflict and illegal financing, the drugs trade, ‘conflict diamonds’, the availability 
of small and light weapons (SALW), or the activities of extractive companies in potential 
and actual crisis regions6. Mention of these last issues reminds us of how much NGO and 
independent charitable activity, also, is still devoted to the challenge of armed conflicts 
and their consequences. 
 
The issues the international community must face today in dealing with the many-faceted 
problem of conflict will be discussed again in the final section of this paper. The basis for 
any good response, however, should be an assured factual grasp of the challenge. What is 
the historic and more recent trend in the total number of conflicts? What changes of 
degree, balance and distribution may be seen in armed conflicts of different types and 
origins, and in their intensity (measured in loss of human life)?  What analytical tools and 
hypotheses might help to explain the trends, and to guess at their future dynamics? 
 
The second section of this paper presents and discusses several data sets designed to 
answer these questions, drawn from the publications of the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) and initially provided by the Conflict Data Project at Uppsala 
University (UCDP).7 The third section offers a review of some current analytical issues of 
interest in research on armed conflict phenomena.  The fourth and final section reverts to 
the question of the international community’s response and provides, inter alia, statistics 
and analysis on the recent evolution of international crisis management operations. 
 
II. Statistical Trends 
The statistics on which this section is based, as explained above, are limited to battle-
related deaths in ‘armed’ conflicts, i.e., those in which military force is used in a more or 
less organized fashion by the two contending sides. They do not include deaths from 
secondary causes closely related to conflict, such as forced migration, famine, and disease; 
and this needs to be borne in mind when considering the comments further below on 
conflict ‘intensity’. Moreover, in order to minimize disputes over the borderline for 
                                                 
5 For the outcome of recent OECD discussions on the extent to which Security Sector 
Reform can be defined and counted as a contribution to development aid, see: OECD, 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), ‘Security Sector Reform and Governance: 
Policy and Good Practice’, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (OECD: Paris 2004), 
pp. 16-18, URL http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf. 
6 See the chapters on the business/conflict connection in Bailes A. and Frommelt I., eds. ‘Business and 
Security: public-private partnerships in a new security enviornment’, OUP for SIPRI, May 2004. 
 5
7 The UCDP is based at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Uppsala, Sweden: 
see http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/. Grateful acknowledgement is made to UCDP for the use of the 
data quoted in section II. 
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including or not including a given conflict, and to arrive at multi-year data series of 
maximum reliability, the counting approach used by UCDP (in the statistical analyses it 
provides for SIPRI yearbooks) is founded on a specific definition of a major armed 
conflict. This is one in which the violence has reached a level claiming at least 1000 battle-
related deaths in total in at least one year of its history. The estimates of deaths are arrived 
at by compiling reports of individual incidents, and are deliberately conservative—if no 
well-documented figure is available, none is used. Conflicts that meet the 1000-death 
criterion are further sub-divided according to whether the dispute underlying them 
primarily concerns the control of government or the control of territory. (A dispute under 
either heading may have more than just two parties). Finally, the UCDP definitions have 
traditionally covered only conflicts where at least one of the parties is a government: 
although work is now in hand at Uppsala University to collect comparable data on major 
conflicts involving two non-state entities, and one-sided violence such as genocide carried 
out by a government or other organized group.8
 
 
Table 1. Regional distribution, number and types of major armed conflicts, 1990–2003 
 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
Region G T G T G T G T G T G T G T G T G T G T G T G T G T G T 
Africa 8 3 8 3 6 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 2 1 4 – 10 1 10 1 8 1 7 – 6 – 4 – 
America 4 – 4 – 3 – 3 – 3 – 3 – 3 – 2 – 2 – 2 – 2 – 3a – 3a – 3a – 
Asia 4 8 3 7 4 7 4 5 4 5 4 6 4 5 3 5 3 5 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 
Europe – – – 1 – 3 – 5 – 4 – 3 – 1 – – – 1 – 2 – 1 – 1 – 1 – 1 
MiddleEast 1 3 2 4 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 – 2 1 2 
Total 17 14 17 15 15 14 15 15 14 14 13 14 11 11 11 7 17 9 15 11 14 10 14a 9 11a 9 10a 9 
Total 31 33 29 30 28 27 22 18 26 26 24 23a 20a 19a 
G = government and T = territory, the two types of incompatibility. 
a This number includes the conflict between the USA and al-Qaeda. See Eriksson, M., 
Sollenberg, M. and Wallensteen, P., ‘Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1990–2001’, SIPRI 
Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2002), pp. 67–68, for an elaboration of the preliminary assessment of this case 
and its ambiguities. 
 
Source: Eriksson, M. and Wallensteen, P., ‘Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1990–2003’ 
in SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2004), pp. 132–39, table 3A.1, p. 134. Original source: The Uppsala 
Conflict Data Project. 
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8 The formal definition of a SIPRI/UCDP ‘major armed conflict’ is thus: ‘a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of 2 
parties, of which at least 1 party is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 1000 battle-related 
deaths in any single year’. For further explanations and notes on methodology see App. 3A, ‘Patterns of 
major armed conflicts, 1990-2003’ and App.3B, ‘Definitions, sources and methods for the conflict data’, by 
M. Eriksson and P. Wallensteen in ‘SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security’, as note 1 above. 
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Table 2. Regional distribution of locations with at least one major armed conflict, 1990–2003 
Region 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Africa 10  10  7  7  6  5 3 4 11 11 9 7 6 4 
America 4  4  3  3  3  3 3 2 2 2 2 3a 3a 3a 
Asia 8  7  9  8  8  8 9 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 
Europe – 1 3 4 3  3 1 – 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Middle 
East 
4 4 4 4 5  4 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 
Total 26 26 26 26 25  23 20 18 26 25 23 22a 19a 18a 
a This number includes the conflict between the USA and al-Qaeda. See Eriksson, M., 
Sollenberg, M. and Wallensteen, P., ‘Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1990–2001’, 
SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2002), pp. 67–68, for an elaboration of the preliminary 
assessment of this case and its ambiguities. 
 
Source: Eriksson, M. and Wallensteen, P., ‘Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1990–2003’ 
in SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2004), pp. 132–39, table 3A.1, p. 134. Original source: The 
Uppsala Conflict Data Project. 
 
Table 3. Regional distribution and total number of major armed conflicts,  
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The first important finding to emerge from Tables 1–3 is that the total number of major 
conflicts in the world has declined overall since the end of the cold war. The figures of 32 
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conflicts for 1990 and 33 for 1991 compare with just 20 conflicts in 2002 and as few as 19 
in 2003. Moreover, since a total of 59 different major conflicts have been recorded in 
1990-2003 and only 19 are current now, it may be concluded that more than two thirds of 
the conflicts present in the last 14-year period have also been solved (at least temporarily) 
during that time. The trend of decline as pictured in Table 3 has been relatively smooth, 
apart from a sudden dip in the number of conflicts in 1996-7 (largely explained by a lull in 
conflicts in Africa).  
 
The second striking feature is the drop in the proportion of ‘traditional’ conflicts between 
nation-states. From 1946 to 1989 there were 15 major inter-state conflicts, but of the total 
of 31 conflicts registered in 1990, only one was of this type. In 2003 only 2 conflicts could 
be classified as ‘inter-state’, one being the familiar dispute between India and Pakistan and 
the other, the hostilities in Iraq between Saddam Hussein’s régime and the US-led 
international coalition, which had claimed at least 1000 deaths since March 2003.9 Two 
other inter-state conflicts, Ethiopia versus Eritrea and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, had 
been ended within the 1990-2003 period. The reasons for and the consequences of the 
prevalence of intra-state (internal, civil) conflicts will be discussed further in section III 
below, but two preliminary points are worth making here by as a warning against over-
strict categorization. First, it is rather unusual for an intra-state war to remain a purely 
‘civil’ one contained inside one state’s boundaries. In the different regions of Africa, 
especially, cross-border ethnic links and refugee movements easily provoke ‘over-spill’ 
from one country to its neighbours and create temptations for the latter to get involved on 
their own account—rather than as peace-makers. In a more ‘post-modern’ illustration, the 
deaths inflicted on American soil by al-Qaeda in September 2001 led directly to the 
invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrowing of its Taliban regime—the protectors of al-
Qaeda—by a US-led coalition in 2002. Secondly, as the case of the Balkan conflicts 
illustrates well, a conflict that begins as an intra-state one may turn out to be only soluble 
by a territorial separation leading to the creation of two or more new states. One of the 
policy challenges the international community still seems to find it hardest to cope with, 
when intervening in a conflict, is to judge when it should accept or actively promote such a 
‘secessionist’ solution (vide the present unresolved debates over Kosovo). 
 
Thirdly, the statistics for 1990-2003 show a growing tendency to confine major conflicts to 
the developing regions of the world, and in particular to the Southern hemisphere. The 
figures for conflicts in the wider European region peaked in 1993 when there was active 
violence both in the Balkans and in several parts of former Soviet territory, but by 2003 
had been reduced to the single intra-state conflict in Chechnya (Russia). The number of 
conflicts in the Middle East has been roughly static over the period. Conflicts in Latin 
America have shown a decided decline from yearly totals of 5 or 6 in the first half of the 
1990’s to just two that merit listing now (the intra-state conflicts in Peru and Colombia), 
and it would generally be agreed that the risk of inter-state conflict both in Central and 
Southern America has now virtually disappeared. This leaves Africa and Asia (especially 
South and South-East Asia) as the world’s most consistently conflict-torn regions of 
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9 Conflict phenomena linked with the USA’s ‘war on terrorism’ since 11 September 2001 have caused 
evident difficulties of classification under the SIPRI/UCDP system. In the present tables, an ‘intra-state’ 
conflict is recorded in the American continent to reflect the large casualties inflicted by al-Qaeda in its 2001 
attacks against the US Government, and the fact that the conflict with al-Qaeda as such is still not closed. 
The Iraq war of 2003-4 is recorded as an inter-state conflict in the Middle East because it involved an attack 
by the US and other governments on a standing Iraqi government. (Note that in other cases where 
international peace-keeping forces deploy, with or without UN mandate, to control or stop conflicts started 
by two or more local parties, the interveners are not counted as parties to the conflict.) 
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modern times. Although Africa would come first to most people’s minds as the region of 
conflicts par excellence, it has in fact alternated with Asia in that capacity over the last 15 
years. In 1996 Africa had only three active major conflicts against Asia’s 9; in 1999, 11 
against Asia’s 7. At the present time, Asia is ‘leading’ with 7 conflicts in 2003 (to be fair, 
mostly long-standing rather than new ones) compared with only 4 in Africa.10 These 
statistics are sufficient to explain the general shift of security concerns among many 
Northern hemisphere populations away from conflict as a threat to themselves, and 
towards fear of ‘trans-national’ scourges like terrorism and/or ‘soft security’ ones like 
disease, environmental damage or social and economic malfunction. However, it is as well 
to note that a number of conflicts in the former Soviet space are only precariously 
‘frozen’;11 that there has been constant concern about the violence in Chechnya spilling 
over to neighbouring, Russian or non-Russian, territories; and that there are unresolved 
‘hot spots’ in North-East Asia (North Korea, Taiwan) where armed conflict not only 
remains possible but would be likely intimately to involve the leading Western powers.  
 
A fourth observation that can be made is about the pattern of conflict causation. Among 
conflicts overall in 1990-2003, it is impossible to say whether disputes about the control of 
government, or about territory—which might involve either inter-state border disputes, or 
secessionist claims for control of certain regions—were more important. Each category has 
claimed about half of the total conflicts over the period, although disputes over 
government are currently slightly ahead. In terms of underlying causation the distinction is 
not a very strong one anyway, since a disaffected ethnic group (to take a common 
example) might either try to carve out its own territory, or to take over control of the 
central government so as to serve its own interests better, or both. It is, however, of some 
interest to note that disputes over control of government have consistently dominated the 
African conflict statistics, while conflicts over territory have always been more numerous 
in Asia12 and are currently in clear preponderance (6 out of 8). In Latin America, conflicts 
involving territorial disputes dominated up to the mid-1990’s but have not done so since: a 
change that seems to reflect a deliberate effort for inter-state reconciliation and moves 
towards multilateral cooperation over much of the continent, linked with at least temporary 
advances in internal democracy. Another point that emerges from a comparison of Tables 
1 and 2 is that a number of countries have featured as the site of more than one conflict in a 
single year, and—somewhat contrary to expectation—this has more often been the case in 
Latin America, and South and South-East Asia, than in Africa. This is not to say that a 
given African country may not face potential conflicts on several frontiers at once, and/or 
internally: but something seems to have ensured in the last decade that these problems 
should arise serially rather than all at once. 
 
                                                 
10 Asia also had 4 conflicts that took at least 1000 lives within the year of 2003, compared with one in Africa 
(Liberia). However, it should be noted that the brewing conflict in the Democratic Republic off the Congo 
was not yet listed in 2003 (because of the method of counting deaths) and that the Asian listing included 2 
separate conflicts involving India, the intra-state insurrection in Kashmir and the inter-state conflict with 
Pakistan. (The insurrection in the Indian province of Assam was also listed in some SIPRI/UCDP tables in 
the past but has been dropped following a reassessment of the death toll). 
11  E.g. between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, in the Transdniestria province of Moldova, 
and in several provinces of Georgia. 
 9
12 It should be noted that many of these are not inter-state boundary disputes, but arise rather from 
populations’ belief in an inherent ethnic right to territory (‘sons of the soil’) clashing with the consequences 
of more recent population movements and mixing, and with efforts to extend the writ of the central state 
authorities.  
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Fifth and not least is the question of conflict ‘intensity’, i.e., the number of deaths recorded 
in a given year. It is difficult to build much analysis on the figures in the Tables 1–3 and 
the UCDP data-base, given that the definition of ‘battle-related’ deaths has been kept 
deliberately narrow, and that the availability of data on this matter in general can be very 
poor.13  Killings in combat may be the smallest part of the total casualties, and of the 
population’s suffering, during the present-day internecine type of war: and deaths from 
secondary causes such as disease, famine and the consequences of displacement naturally 
become a more serious factor, the longer the fighting goes on. Milton Leitenberg, who has 
attempted to compile total figures for deaths both directly and indirectly related to conflicts 
in the period 1945-2000, points out that in Cambodia under the regime of Pol Pot after 
1975, less than 100,000 persons are thought to have been killed directly in combat while 
total casualties were around 2 million.  Among other cases cited by him with a great excess 
of indirect civilian deaths over direct military ones are the Korean War of 1950-53, earlier 
civil wars in India, Bangladesh, China, Uganda, Nigeria and Guatemala, the continuing 
intra-state conflict in Colombia, and massacres or genocidal events in countries like 
Uganda and Rwanda.  At the other extreme are cases like the Iran-Iraq war of 1988 which 
may have caused as many as 1.8 million casualties, but only among combatant troops.14 At 
any rate, the figures for any given conflict can swing widely from year to year as fighting 
dies down in one place or flares up in another. To take the most recent examples, between 
2002 and 2003 five conflicts showed an increase of more than 50% in battle-related deaths 
while four showed a drop in deaths by the same amount. The numbers of conflicts 
becoming more intensive, and less intensive, respectively over that period were almost 
exactly the same (seven as against eight). In consequence, in the list of the six ‘most 
deadly’ conflicts for 2002 and the same list for 2003, only two out of the six were the same 
in both years (India and Nepal).15
 
III. Conflict Analysis: Some Contemporary Issues 
The observations made above are only the starting-point for an adequate analysis of where 
the world’s present-day armed conflicts come from and where they are going. The 
statistics alone can tell us little about what triggers a given conflict; how different conflicts 
inter-relate dynamically; what makes them worse, what moves them towards a solution, 
and which kinds of solutions are most likely to endure. In this section, four aspects of the 
deeper analysis of modern conflicts will be discussed: (a) how to explain and understand 
the prevalence of intra-state conflicts; (b) the challenge of very protracted conflicts; (c) the 
pitfalls of efforts to contain and terminate conflicts; and (d) the relationship between 
conflict and terrorism. This is far from representing the full range of questions that might 
usefully be asked, but it does cover issues particularly relevant to the conflict management 
                                                 
13  —inter alia, because of deliberate suppression and distortions by the combatant parties, in territories 
where objective international monitoring is difficult. The controversy that blew up in November 2004 over a 
British institution’s estimate of 100,000 Iraqi deaths following the US-led coalition’s invasion in March 2003 
offers a case in print. 
14 Leitenberg estimates the total number of conflict-related deaths for the 1945-2000 period as around 40 
million, or about three quarters of a million per year on average.  This contrasts with the figure of 4 million, 
or about a third of a million per year, quoted by the EU for total deaths in the period 1990-2003 (European 
Security Strategy, note 2 above) – although there is no way of knowing whether the counting methods used 
were comparable. M. Leitenberg, ‘Deaths in Wars and Conflicts between 1945 and 2000’ (rev.ed.), Center 
for International and Policy Studies, Univ. of Maryland, 2003. 
 10
15 It is, of course, the aim of international intervention to reduce if not totally eliminate the number of deaths 
in a given conflict, and this effect may be traced in the relevant statistics e.g. for the Balkan wars. However, 
international suppression of one manifestation of a given conflict may ‘squeeze out’ more violence and 
deaths elsewhere, as discussed in section III below. 
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policies of concerned states and institutions16. It should thus help pave the way for the 
explicit discussion of current challenges in conflict management that follows in section III 
below. 
 
(a) The dominance of intra-state conflict 
The present prevalence of intra-state conflicts in all the world’s continents actually 
demands a double explanation: why conflicts of this kind persist, and why inter-state 
conflicts (which dominated most other ages of history) have virtually died out. The latter 
issue is the less often discussed of the two, and there is probably no single good 
explanation for it. One theory often quoted—admittedly, less as an interpretation of the 
past than as a prescription for the future—is that ‘democratic states do not go to war with 
each other’17. It is true that a great expansion in the number of states enjoying some form 
of democratic rule has coincided with the overall drop in conflicts since 1990, but the 
world’s inter-state conflicts had already been reduced to single digits before that. In any 
case, there is plenty of room for quibbling about the definition of the thesis itself: several 
of the Latin American and African states that have fought each other in the past would 
have considered themselves democracies at the time; and there is evidence that newly 
developing and ‘imperfect’ democracies may be especially prone to instabilities that could 
trigger both internal and external conflict;18 and the thesis says nothing about conflicts 
caused when an incontestably democratic state attacks a non-democratic one.19
 
A safer explanation might lie in the impact of the Second World War and the lessons 
learned after it especially by Western nations, which led not only to the establishment of 
the United Nations Organization but also to the creation of the European Communities and 
Council of Europe—designed to end intra-West European conflicts for ever—and the 
deliberate ‘pacification’ policies employed to secure both internal and external policy 
change in Germany and Japan. The East-West bloc confrontation that then developed in 
Europe, with capacities on both sides for assured mutual destruction by nuclear weapons, 
effectively blocked resort to military conflict in the two alliances’ own zones of control, 
leading to a number of ‘proxy wars’ between protégés in other continents instead. There is 
room for differences of opinion over whether the total level of conflict in non-European 
regions was enhanced or suppressed as a result; but it is at least arguable that since each 
bloc had an interest in avoiding possible escalation from local to global war, more 
potential spill-over effects were restrained than were deliberately promoted, and static 
local stand-offs (without significant conflict) between proxies were often preferred. In any 
case, there were also significant conflict dynamics at play that had nothing to do with the 
Western and Eastern blocs: notably the intra-state and occasionally inter-state violence 
associated with de-colonialization, which rose and ebbed in different continents and 
different nations’ colonial empires at different times, reaching its last peak in the former 
Portuguese colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and East Timor). Generally 
speaking this had also passed its worst by the 1990’s, and was succeeded by particularly 
energetic attempts at multinational cooperation for maintaining the peace in precisely those 
                                                 
16 These same themes are also covered in greater detail in Dwan, R and Gustavsson. M, ‘Major armed 
conflicts’. in SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, OUP summer 
2004. 
17 An assertion initially made by Immanuel Kant in ‘The Perpetual Peace’, but much quoted and explored by 
recent authors such as Bruce Russett. 
18 Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous thesis (in ‘L’Ancien Régime’) that ‘the most dangerous time for a 
weak government is when it starts to reform’; and recent experience in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, 
the post-Soviet states of the South Caucasus, and African states like Algeria, Rwanda and Guinea-.Bissau.  
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regions that had been most heavily ‘colonialized’.20 A weaker but broadly parallel trend 
might be traced in the greater Middle East, where earlier ‘Arab-Israel’ conflicts have now 
been narrowed down to an ‘Israel-Palestinians’ one and where the last local inter-state war 
was the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, as long ago as 1991. 
 
The end of the Cold War disposed of the ‘balance of terror’ that had blocked most possible 
inter-state wars in the Northern hemisphere, but it was succeeded by an alternative system 
of positive partnership networks, agreements, and negotiating processes on territorial and 
other bones of contention that were designed to have the same effect. In Europe the most 
significant processes of these kinds during the 1990’s were NATO’s Partnership for Peace, 
the direct relationships of Russia with NATO and the EU, the efforts of the OSCE, and 
NATO’s and the EU’s enlargement processes that effectively drew the great majority of 
Central European states into the former West’s ‘war-free zone’. (The EU now explicitly 
aspires to end war for ever in the Western Balkans by giving the new democracies there 
the same prospect of eventual full membership.21) Not to be overlooked, however, are the 
parallel normalization and stabilization processes between Russia and China, which now 
include the aforementioned ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization’22 (also including 4 
Central Asian states) designed to avoid tension on shared borders and to cooperate against 
shared enemies like terrorism, combined with progress towards solving the last Sino-
Russian frontier demarcation disputes.23 All these trends help to explain why the ‘North’ 
itself is now relatively free of armed conflicts of any kind; but also why those civil 
conflicts that persist even in the heart of the West (like Northern Ireland) are in no risk of 
causing inter-state overspill, and why cases of overt ‘competitive’ intervention by rival 
larger powers on different sides in a regional conflict have dwindled (although such 
manipulation can still happen in more disguised ways, cf. the growing Chinese 
engagement in Sudan). 
 
If we turn now to reasons promoting intra-state conflicts, those over territory can be of a 
particularly stubborn and long-lived nature. It is important to note that claims by sub-state 
actors to control their own local territories, and possibly to secede from the mother-state, 
do not always have to coincide with ethnic differences and are not necessarily the most 
intractable when they do. There is a wide range of palliative measures that can be used to 
make different ethnic and cultural communities comfortable within a single state,24 and the 
last decades have seen several examples of wholly peaceful secession and the voluntary 
                                                 
20 E.g. South East Asia (ASEAN, which has now absorbed and ‘pacified’ Vietnam and Cambodia and aspires 
to do the same for Burma/Myanmar); Africa (ECOWAS, Southern African Development Community, Africa 
Union); and Central and Southern America (OAS, Andean Pact, MERCOSUR and the new SACN). 
21 A new partnership status with the real if remote prospect of EU accession was first opened up for these 
states by the EU’s Stability Pact for the Western Balkans (http:www.stabilitypact.org); for the EU’s latest 
strategy document on Bosnia-Herzegovina which talks more openly about accession leverage see Council of 
the European Union doc. 10099/04, PESC 441, of 15 June 2004. 
22 On the SCO see the chapter by Trofimov, D. in ‘Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia’, SIPRI Policy Paper No 3 of 2003, text at http://www.sipri.org. 
23 The last contested portion of territory along the Sino-Russian frontier was disposed of by a bilateral 
agreement in late 2004 and the transfer of the small area in question will be accompanied by measures of 
military disengagement and confidence-building along the new border. Russia has also recently made a move 
to solve a long-standing territorial dispute with Japan by offering to split the sovereign control of the islands 
known by Japan as the Northern Territories.  
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grant of far-reaching autonomy to ethnically-defined communities in developed nations.25 
Conflict arises and persists, rather, when the local combatants define their demands (for 
whatever reason) in absolute terms that allow no ‘shades of grey’ - such as complete 
independence or secession - thereby challenging the survival of the given state and/or 
régime as it stands (cf. Chechnya, Indonesia (Aceh), or the Karen National Union in 
Myanmar). Such attitudes more or less rule out the use of ‘softer’ inducements (e.g. 
economic benefits) as steps towards a solution, and they are liable to drive the central state 
authorities into an equally uncompromising stance, as it sees both its physical control and 
its authority at stake. In some such cases, even the achievement of substantial autonomy or 
nationhood does not solve the problem as the ‘zero-sum’ attitudes of new local leaders 
continue to cause problems e.g. with any residual minorities from the ‘parent’ nation on 
their territory (cf. the current problems in Kosovo, or the independent Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, FYROM). Generally speaking, the only types of settlements that 
give a reliable prospect of avoiding further conflict – aside from the complete victory of 
one side or the other - are those in which both sides to the dispute are able to move away 
from their absolutist positions and make significant concessions (e.g., the attempted 
settlement brokered by the EU’s CFSP High Representative Javier Solana between Serbia 
and Montenegro in 2002). The stability or ‘finality’ of this type of solution is itself a 
doubtful quantity, but the odds seem to be improved if and when both parties can be 
integrated in some wider framework of regional cooperation, thus strengthening both the 
material incentives and normative pressures for good behaviour.26
 
Internal conflicts over the control of government may also be triggered by ethnic concerns 
and certain kinds of territorial interests (e.g., the wish to control sources of lucrative 
resources), but they have many other potential motives that can exist in combination with 
or independently from these. Political grievances connected with oppression, 
discrimination, abuse of rights and denial of representation often play a part, as do the 
equivalent economic phenomena, and religious or ideological motivations. A particularly 
intractable type of conflict is associated with militant ideologies that by definition produce 
the ‘zero-sum’ attitude mentioned above, and this by no means applies only to militant 
Islamic fundamentalism. Countries such as Colombia, Nepal, Peru and the Philippines 
have all been affected in recent years by rural-based insurgencies calling themselves 
Communist, Marxist or Maoist, and these are among the most cruel and costly of all 
today’s conflicts: at least 28,000 deaths so far in the Peruvian conflict with Sendero 
Luminoso, 21-25,000 deaths ascribed to the conflict with the  Communist Party of the 
Philippines, and an estimated total of 5,000 deaths to end-2003 in the rapidly worsening 
conflict with Maoist insurgents in Nepal (not to mention the more familiar case of 
Colombia). These conflicts have also been characterized by frequent resort to ‘terror’ 
tactics such as bombings, public assassinations and kidnappings, arbitrary abduction and 
torture—sometimes by both sides. In general, contemporary conflicts over government 
with multiple motives and, often, multiple contestants tend to produce particularly chaotic 
and brutal conditions in which the targets of violence become randomised, warfare zones 
                                                 
25 E.g. the ‘velvet divorce’ of the Czech Republic and Slovakia , and British measures for partial autonomy in 
Scotland and Wales. 
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26 A growing recognition of the complexity of these challenges, including the problems that can persist after 
autonomy or secession, may help explain why the international community’s approach to this problem is no 
longer dominated by arguments for and against a single principle such as ‘self-determination’. For further 
analysis see M. Marshall and T. Gurr (eds.), ‘Peace and Conflict 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, 
Self-Determination Movements and Democracy’, pub. C1 DCM Univ. of Maryland, available online at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr.peace.htm.  
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can constantly shift, and ‘norm-breaking’ phenomena like torture, terror, the use of child 
soldiers, and ethnic cleansing or genocide are rife. 
 
It is often hard for the outside world to understand why the inhabitants of a country should 
want to behave in such ways and let such conditions persist, so this type of internal conflict 
has drawn particular analytical attention in recent years. One interesting type of 
explanation that has emerged is related to perverse economic factors that not only sustain 
the various combatants’ ability to fight, but can make the continuation of conflict seem 
positively profitable and the making of peace an economic liability. This kind of ‘war 
economy’ can be linked with/based on drug production and trafficking, the illegal trade in 
‘conflict diamonds’, or the control of territories containing oil and other valuable natural 
resources and their unlicensed extraction and sale—as well as the more traditional 
practices of gun-running and trafficking in human beings.27 These factors have been 
easiest to trace at work in recent conflicts in resource-rich parts of Africa, and they have 
stimulated the international community to try to contain and end conflict by gaining 
control of the identifiable resource flows involved. For example, the UN established a 
Panel of Experts to find out the processes and persons involved in illegal resource use in 
connection with conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;28 and from 2001 
onwards, the UN imposed sanctions to stop the régime of President Charles Taylor in 
Liberia trading in arms, diamonds and (from 2003) in timber. The same type of concern 
has helped to drive the manifold recent efforts to get a grip on the international trading, 
both state and non-state, of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) which are seen as the 
typical ‘poor man’s weapon’ fuelling the intensity of many local conflicts.29 What has not, 
perhaps, been sufficiently discussed is the dynamic impact of aid given by outside powers 
to the embattled governments involved, both in cash and kind (i.e. weapons) or through the 
provision of advisers: the US in particular has stepped up this kind of input to the 
economics of war in territories that it sees as being threatened by terrorist-linked 
insurgencies since 2001.30
 
Another popular and quite persuasive set of explanations are those linked with the 
phenomenon of “weak” or “failed” states. Almost any kind of state, open and democratic 
or authoritarian and repressive, can be judged “weak” if it loses its official monopoly of 
the use of force, and is not able to stop internal violence and or external attacks either by 
compromise and reconciliation or by direct coercion. Countries may get into this condition 
as the result of changes of régime, structure and circumstance that propel them towards 
conflict, or as a side-effect of (external or internal) conflict itself.  It is theoretically easy to 
see why situations of this type should create such chaotic and brutal conditions, because 
the vacuum of authority encourages different forces to contend for it, using terror and the 
intimidation of the population among their weapons. The task of ending violence and 
moving back towards normality then demands, not just – as in traditional notions of 
                                                 
27 See D. Keen, ‘The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars’, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 320/OUP, 
Oxford 1998), and K. Ballentine and H. Nitzchke, ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from 
Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict’, International Peace Academy New York 2003, 
available at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/BGG_rpt.pdf; also the chapters by C.Batruch and A. 
Bone in ‘Business and Security…’, as note 6 above. 
28 For the Panel’s report presented in Oct. 2003 see UN document S/2003/1027 of 23/10/03. Similar Panels 
were appointed for Angola and Liberia. 
29 On this issue see e.g. the Small Arms Survey website: htpp://www.smallarmssurvey.org. 
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Disarmament and International Security (OUP for SIPRI summer 2004); Anderson, M.B., ‘Do no harm: how 
can aid support peace – or war’ (Lynne Riener: Boulder, Colo., 1999); and also part (d) of this section below. 
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‘peace-keeping’ – a modification of the behaviour of pre-existing authorities and/or a 
change of their leadership: but the re-building of everything that constitutes a viable and 
well-governed state, in some cases almost from scratch.  International experience and 
improved analysis of such situations over the last decade has probably been the single 
strongest influence pushing today’s thinking about post-conflict situations towards a 
notion of full-spectrum, multi-functional intervention, and thus highlighting the challenge 
of coordinating the full range of relevant international and national instruments (see 
section III below). 
 
(b) Why conflicts last 
As the total number of conflicts world-wide has diminished, so the long-term persistence 
of a number of particularly stubborn and intractable conflicts (mainly intra-state but with 
the prominent inter-state example of India and Pakistan) has assumed even greater 
salience.  Not all the important cases of this type are covered by the UCDP statistics: 
some, like Northern Ireland or the inter-state tension between the two Koreas, are not 
counted because of relatively low levels of deaths, but they pose very much the same 
challenges for understanding and for policy. Even so, a survey of the 19 ‘major’ conflicts 
reported by SIPRI/UCDP for 2003 shows that 4 of these (Colombia, Kashmir, India-
Pakistan and Myanmar) have clearly identified or presumed dates of origin earlier than 
1950, and 6 more (Peru, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Israel/Palestinians and Turkey) 
have dates antecedent to 1980. In other words, more than half of the costliest conflicts still 
extant today are at least 24 years old. While some of them (e.g. in Myanmar, Peru and 
Turkey) may temporarily be quiescent, the potential for a new flare-up is always there so 
long as no settlement of the underlying issues in contention has been reached.31
 
In general terms, it is fairly easy to explain why a conflict might become ‘self-sustaining’ 
after persisting for a certain time. Any economic interests, distortions and accommodations 
involved (see last section) become ingrained, and violence and hatred can become cultural 
assumptions passed down from generation to generation. Almost equally insidious is the 
way that the regional and international community can adjust to ‘living with’ somebody 
else’s conflict, especially if the country concerned is so remote that its conflict dynamics 
provoke little interaction with others (Myanmar), but also in the case of multifariously 
integrated countries whose partners learn to compartmentalize and ‘look aside from’ their 
unhealed sores of violence (UK, Turkey, etc.—and there is a growing temptation to treat 
Russia this way over Chechnya). In many of the current conflicts of pre-1990 origin listed 
above, a further shared characteristic is that neither (or none) of the combatant parties 
world welcome or, at least, sincerely support and comply with external attempts at 
mediation: either because of basic attitudes of pride, distrust and so forth, or because so 
many hopes attached to earlier international settlement proposals have been dashed. 
 
Over the long time-scales that are involved here, conflicts can develop many complexities 
and idiosyncrasies of their own, so that no simple analytical frame fits all. To give some 
sense of these individual dynamics and the obstacles they can put in the way of progress, 
recent developments will be sketched in the ideologically-fired internal conflict in 
Colombia and in the conflicts, essentially related to self-determination, between Israel and 
the Palestinians and in Sri Lanka. 
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previously known as PKK) declared on 1 September 2003 that it was ending its previously agreed cease-fire. 
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Colombia: the Colombian Government has been under attack since the late 1960s from 
two armed groups inspired by Marxist ideology, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). FARC and the ELN 
have their power bases in the South and the North of the country respectively and act, in 
general, also as rivals with each other. In the type of twist that easily occurs in protracted 
conflicts, a group of right-wing paramilitary organizations known as the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (AUC) has appointed itself responsible for eradicating FARC and the 
ELN, and has itself carried out numerous atrocities against civilians. All these movements 
have become entangled with and dependent on criminal sources of revenue from drug 
trafficking, and also kidnapping and extortion.  Casualties over the whole period of the 
conflict are assessed at nearly 60,000. The US, as is well known, has taken a special 
interest in the conflict because of the linkage with drug supply to the US’s own territory, 
but also because of the involvement of US oil companies in the Arauca region of North-
East Colombia and the need to protect an oil pipeline that runs from there. 
 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Vélez, elected in May 2002, has been associated with a 
new strategy to tackle the different parts of the conflict by differential methods and with a 
more determined use of force, backed by US assistance. The President offered an effective 
amnesty to AUC members in return for demobilization, and some steps have been taken in 
this direction, although international observers have been concerned about the effect of the 
implied indemnity for past massacres. Towards FARC and the ELN Uribe has taken an 
uncompromising line, refusing any thought of peace negotiations until and unless the rebel 
movements renounce violence. The Government’s counter-insurgency strategy launched in 
2002 gives new powers to the military and police, and makes use of a new part-time force 
of 16,000 peasant soldiers. Several government attacks were launched against rebels in the 
Arauca oil zone during 2003, and US Special Forces were deployed there in January 2003 
to help train Colombian soldiers for more effective defence of the pipeline. In general, the 
aid Colombia receives from the US has climbed since the inauguration of ‘Plan Colombia’ 
in 2000, making Colombia now the single largest recipient of such assistance in Latin 
America. Restrictions on Colombia’s use of the aid to directly support actions against the 
rebels were lifted in 2002, and in 2003 the US Administration granted Colombia an extra 
$320 million to combat illegal arms transfers, drug production and trafficking, and $130 
million specifically for the purpose of measures against FARC, the ELN, and AUC.32
 
President Uribe’s policies have brought a measurable decrease in the levels of violence 
affecting many parts of Colombia, and have earned him high levels of popularity at home. 
They have not, however, so far come anywhere near breaking the rebels’ resistance, 
especially in the South,33 while combatants who have been hard-pressed in the North have 
simply shifted their areas of operation with consequences including a number of cross-
border incidents (with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil). The President’s assertive 
policies and readiness to provide a major base for US strategic influence in the area have 
made some of his neighbours, notably Venezuela, more generally uneasy. Perhaps the 
most vulnerable point of the strategy is its dependence on continued high levels of US aid 
in the short term - a matter under intense negotiation at the end of 2004—and in the 
medium term, on being able to boost economic growth fast enough to generate funds for 
drug-income-replacement programmes and for the rehabilitation of conflict-torn areas in 
general. In sum, the strategy of the Colombian Government and its allies illustrates both 
                                                 
32 For an update on US aid see Center for International Policy (CIP), ‘US aid to Colombia since 1997: 
summary tables’, URL http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm.  
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the logic of pinning a conflict-resolution drive on the reassertion of the central state 
monopoly of force, and the high risks and costs of such a programme when authority has 
in practice been fragmented for a matter of decades. 
 
The Israel/Palestinians conflict goes back initially to the war of 1948-49 and more 
specifically to the Six-Day War of June 1967, when Israel occupied the Palestinian-settled 
territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Periods of sustained Palestinian uprising 
(‘Intifada’) against the Israeli occupation have alternated since then with efforts—
invariably launched by outside powers—at a peaceful settlement that would complement 
the modus vivendi Israel has reached (albeit still fragile in places) with its neighbouring 
Arab nation-states. The first Intifada of 1987-1993 was ended by the Oslo accords signed 
by Israeli and Palestinian representatives under Norwegian mediation, but implementation 
of the Oslo Peace Process broke down in 2000, triggering a second Intifada in September 
of that year. The best-known attempt made subsequently to re-start a peace process is the 
‘Road Map’34 endorsed in 2003 by the ‘Quartet’ of would-be peace brokers consisting of 
the US, UN, EU and Russia. This is noteworthy for the clarity with which it promotes a 
‘two-state solution’—Israel to be fully recognized and guaranteed by its erstwhile 
opponents, and a new sovereign state under full Palestinian control. In the absence of any 
noteworthy progress in this direction, the conflict continues to have grave repercussions 
both within and beyond the disputed territories: terrorist attacks (including suicide 
bombings) against Israeli citizens, sizeable refugee populations, the radicalization of 
Palestinian communities living in exile in the Arab would and elsewhere, the 
internationalization of several of the related terrorist movements, and a so far insuperable 
impediment to general stabilization and the building of ‘inclusive’ multilateral cooperation 
in the ‘greater Middle East’ region as a whole. 
 
The last few years of the conflict have amply illustrated the phenomenon of self-
perpetuating cycles of violence, with terrorist outrages being followed by Israeli retaliation 
(sometimes extending to other states’ territory)35 and vice versa. It has also shown how 
difficult it is for outside actors to take control of the dynamics of the situation and to 
exercise leverage upon either or both sides for meaningful concessions. One reason for 
this, which can arise in relation to other ad hoc as well as long-term conflicts, is that major 
external players—even when united formally behind a single peace plan—in practice make 
different subjective and normative judgements on the ‘rights and wrongs’ of the issue. 
Specifically, and especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the US 
Administration has felt particular sympathy for Israel as the victim of terrorism, while 
European governments tend to be more conscious of the background to Palestinian claims 
for self-determination and of the present sufferings of the Palestinian people (to whom the 
EU gives substantial aid). There have also been differences of analysis over the relative 
importance and instrumentality of the Israel/Palestinians conflict, with UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair and others arguing that progress on the former would improve the conditions 
for a democratic transformation of Iraq after Saddam Hussein (‘the road to Baghdad lies 
through Jerusalem’); while US policy advisers, at least initially, believed that turning the 
tide in Iraq would create new dynamics for solving the Israel/Palestinians confrontation 
and, indeed, other stubborn regional problems (‘the road to Jerusalem leads through 
Baghdad’). 
                                                 
34 See US Institute of Peace, ‘A performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israel-
Palestine conflict’, 30 Apr. 2003, http://www.usip.org/library/pa/israel_plo/adddoc/roadmap_04302003.html.  
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Given these various difficulties and blockages, the most dynamic element in the situation 
in the last years must probably be identified as the policy developed by Israeli Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon—in the face of stiff domestic opposition—of, on the one hand, 
building a 365-km, physical barrier to defend Israel against Palestinian incursions,36 and 
on the other hand, of preparing to pull back Israeli forces and settlements from the Gaza 
strip. While the barrier as such has generally been deplored by international opinion37 and 
has met with legal challenge both at home and abroad38 for the way it encroaches on 
territories not previously assigned to Israel, there is room for different views on its longer-
term implications. Some would see Sharon’s moves as necessary steps towards an eventual 
two-state solution, in which Israel at least initially would need the strongest visible 
guarantees of physical safety. Others suspect an intention on his part to evacuate some 
Palestinian territories only to make it easier to hang on to others on the West Bank, and/or 
to place new obstacles in the way of any truly viable future Palestinian state.39 The 
problems facing the latter have, meanwhile, become a new focus of interest in their own 
right since 2002, when the US led a move to demand and promote higher standards of 
Palestinian democracy. A conference sponsored by the UK and backed by all ‘Quartet’ 
partners took place on this issue on 14 January 2003, leading two months later to the 
appointment of the reform-minded Mahmoud Abbas as Prime Minister of the Palestinian 
Authority. Mahmoud Abbas and his successor from November 2003, Ahmed Qurei, 
however, faced a persistent struggle for power and control of resources with Palestinian 
President Yasser Arafat—who in turn was viewed by Israel and increasingly by the USA 
as nothing more than an obstacle to peace. In these conditions it is easy to appreciate why 
no progress at all was made during 2003-4 with the negotiations and other cooperative 
processes between the conflict parties prescribed by the ‘Road Map’. 
 
Up to this point, the story seems merely to demonstrate the intractability of a long-standing 
conflict in which the two sides’ identities and philosophies, as well as interests, seem 
(literally) existentially opposed; and in which the prima facie asymmetry of military power 
does not lead to a ‘quick and dirty’ solution but rather, provokes a classic ‘asymmetric’ 
reaction in the form of civil disobedience and terrorism. However, some developments at 
the end of 2004 were seen by—at least—the world’s more hopeful observers as having a 
certain potential to rearrange the constellation in a way that might open up new 
possibilities. Perhaps the most fateful was the death in November of Yasser Arafat himself, 
creating the risk of a struggle for power but also the chance of new room for manoeuvre 
(linking up with the existing international pro-democracy efforts) in Palestinian politics. In 
the subsequent Palestinian elections that were held in January 2005, under close 
international scrutiny, Mahmoud Abbas was returned to power on a platform of re-opening 
efforts for peace and trying to disarm or at least bring under control the various extremist 
militias. This goal in itself, however, ensured that his leadership would not be undisputed 
nor his path smooth, as illustrated by the decision of the militant movement Hamas to 
boycott the elections. At the same time, Prime Minister Sharon’s internal difficulties over 
his withdrawal policy led to a change of coalition in Israel that now included the 
                                                 
36 For details see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/fence-imagery.htm.  
37 A UN Resolution calling for a halt to its construction was passed in October 2003 (General Assembly 
Resolution A/RES/ES-10/13, 27 Oct. 2003). 
38 The International Court of Justice issued a ruling against the legality of the barrier in July 2004. 
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traditionally pro-peace Labour Party. Last but not least, the re-election of US Presidential 
George W. Bush for a second term—combined with continuing or even deepening 
problems in the struggle to create a secure democracy in Iraq—has stimulated the UK and 
other like-minded powers to exert fresh pressure for a decisive, pro-peace, American 
diplomatic intervention.40 At the time of writing, it is not possible to say whether these 
developments will come together in a constructive way or, rather, will be drawn into a 
further spiral of zero-sum actions by the parties themselves, putting the eventual two-state 
solution further out of reach just when the international community has rallied around it (at 
least nominally) in greater unity than ever before.41  
 
Sri Lanka: this conflict is essentially a separatist one with ethnic overtones, pitting the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)—with a power base in the North-east of the 
country—against the predominantly Sinhalese central government of Sri Lanka. Since 
1983 this conflict is estimated to have caused some 65,000 deaths and the displacement of 
800,000 to 1 million people. In February 2002 it seemed that a breakthrough might have 
occurred when the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka (Ranil Wickramasinghe) and the LTTE 
leader (Velupillai Prabhakaran) signed an interim ceasefire agreement brokered by 
Norway. However, the ongoing process of peace talks broke down, against a background 
of signs of divided counsels on the government side, when the rebels pulled out of the talks 
in April 2003. In November of that year the President of Sri Lanka (Chandrika 
Kumaratunga) declared a state of emergency and effectively took power out of the hands 
of Wickramasinghe, whom she accused of being ready to cede too much ground to the 
rebels and thereby putting national security and sovereignty at risk.  
 
The problems  underlying the recent stalemate between the government and rebels 
illustrate the blending of separatist, political, and economic motives that can make 
conflicts of this ‘territorial’ kind so difficult to unravel. The Tamil rebels have since 
February 2002 not been calling for complete sovereignty and independence, but they have 
not been able hitherto to find common ground with the government on the terms of 
autonomy for their province, including the nature of the administration to be established 
there and its powers over finance, police, external trade and so on. Also at stake is the 
degree of political recognition to be given to the LTTE as such (still the subject of a ban by 
several outside powers). The proximate reason given for the breakdown of talks in Spring 
2003, however, was the failure to channel as much economic assistance (for refugee 
resettlement and general development) to the conflict zone as the LTTE believed had been 
agreed and as they regarded as necessary. This last point illustrates a phenomenon that will 
figure more centrally in the next section of this paper: namely, the way that measures 
agreed with the best of intentions during internationally-backed peace efforts can 
themselves become bones of contention and, at worst, the source of a new ‘break-out’ into 
armed violence. 
 
Nature was to take a hand (in Sri Lanka and elsewhere), however, with the catastrophic 
tsunami of 26 December 2004 and the appalling human and material damage it inflicted in 
                                                 
40 The UK has since announced (6 Dec. 04) that it will host an international peace conference on the Middle 
East early in 2005. Israel has declined to attend. 
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41 An added question worth noting is whether there might be value, precisely at this time of added mobility, 
in a further attempt at ‘independent’ peace-making by a local state, an honest broker from another region (in 
the style of Norway’s previous role), or some other source—vide for example the unofficial peace plan 
known as the Geneva Accord that was launched by ex-ministers from both the Israeli and the Palestinian 
sides on 1 December 2003.  
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coastal regions. During early 2005, hopes have risen that the disaster might create a new 
opening for conflict settlement: through the powerful forces for reconciliation created 
within Sri Lanka by common suffering, the delivery of humanitarian aid, the logic of 
joining forces for reconstruction, and the common interest not to let conflict obstruct the 
latter; but also because international attention has been called back to the region in the 
most forceful way possible.  Aid donors have been encouraged i.a. by the hope that their 
actions might have added value as a foundation for peace, and some Western politicians 
(notably German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer) have openly suggested that a certain 
conditionality might be established between, at least, the reconstruction phase of assistance 
and the government’s ability to deliver on the peace front.  It remains to be seen whether 
such overt ‘leverage’ can work, or whether it will merely strengthen the instinct of local 
governments to declare as early as possible (as India declared from the outset) that they 
can cope with the damage alone. 
 
(c) Conflicts that ‘break out’ of attempted settlements 
There are, basically, only two ways to end a conflict: by one side overcoming the other(s), 
or by a settlement. Unfortunately, attempts at both results—not just the former—can lead 
to new complications and setbacks, including the resumption and intensification of 
violence. The following are only some of the ways in which peace-making and settlement 
processes can provoke the further use of force: 
 
(a) the parties may intensify their efforts to gain ground and negotiating leverage 
before sitting down to the table; 
(b) one or both negotiating parties may become split internally, with one or more 
factions rejecting the idea of peace and demonstratively returning to the way of 
violence. In such cases, new ‘fronts’ of conflict can be opened within or between 
movements that were previously on the same side; 
(c) factions and individuals who are regarded as irreconcileable, and therefore not 
included in the negotiations to start with, may continue or increase violence partly 
as a protest that their interests are not being taken into account; 
(d) those who have been profiting out of the violence (which could include external 
suppliers or customers, with economic and/or strategic aims) may try to sabotage 
the peace to protect their gains; 
(e) there may be violence directed at the peace-makers themselves, if they are regarded 
as lacking legitimacy and/or as pursuing selfish interests (e.g., in the case of 
neighbouring states who seek to impose a particular outcome). In the worst 
scenarios, a national or international actor intervening ostensibly to make peace 
may slip into the position of an additional party to the conflict, and/or a group of 
actors seeking peace jointly may fall out among themselves; 
(f) if the peace itself is fragile for any or all of these reasons, and/or inadequate 
provision is made for peace ‘keeping’ and ‘building’ after the settlement, order 
may deteriorate and perhaps even new forms of violence break out from a 
combination of resentment, disenchantment and opportunism. 
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In recent times, the types of effects mentioned under (b), (c) and (d) have attracted 
considerable notice under the title of ‘spoiler’ phenomena, leading to increased awareness 
and debate over how many parties it is necessary and feasible to bring within the scope of 
a peace-making process. Recent experience has also highlighted how several of these 
scenarios—notably (b), (c), (e) and (f)—can lead to the emergence of groups using 
terrorist methods, even where the latter were not featured in the conflict before. (The 
general issue of terrorism and conflict will be covered in the next section). 
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Some concrete illustrations of these problems may be taken from recent developments in 
the conflicts in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan. Fighting has been going on in Burundi 
since 1993 between the national government, dominated by the (minority) Tutsi ethnic 
group after a military coup, and two ethnic Hutu rebel groups—the FDD and FNL.42 Some 
200,000 [UPDATE?] lives are estimated to have been lost. A peace process brokered by 
leading politicians in Tanzania and South Africa led to the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreeement signed on Tanzanian soil on 28 August 2000. This provided 
for power-sharing between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups in the framework of a 
transitional government, established in 2001. However, the armed rebel groups on the 
Hutu side, the FDD and FNL, were not included in the peace process and rejected the 
resulting political solution as inadequate and biased, calling instead for a return to the 
constitution of 1992. The South Africa-led Regional Initiative on Burundi then brokered a 
further agreement, signed on 2 December 2002 between the transitional government and 
the FDD, with terms including a ceasefire and the deployment of a military observer 
mission from the African Union.43 As a result of continuing talks, the FDD in March 2003 
agreed to accept the power-sharing arrangements in the 2000 Arusha agreement. The 
Swiss government hosted talks with the remaining armed faction, the FNL, in search of a 
parallel breakthrough. 
 
Despite all these efforts, however, fresh fighting broke out between both rebel groups and 
the government in June 2003. FNL operations included several attacks on the national 
capital, Bujumbura. The FDD’s actions seem to have been dictated by an effort to improve 
the terms of the peace deal, rather than to break out of it: and in fact, it signed a new 
agreement with the government in November 2003 that gave it a greater share of 
government posts and of control in the national army. The FNL, however, remained 
irreconcileable, and in December extended its attacks to FDD personnel as well. Clashes 
continued throughout 2004, and an added complication came when the FNL was formally 
labelled a terrorist movement by neighbouring African states, who called upon the UN and 
African Union to endorse their stand.  As argued further in sub-section (d) below, use of 
the terrorist label is a high-risk tactic that may push settlement further away in the absence 
of power by the labellers simply to crush the labelled. 
 
In the Burundi case, no-one has suggested that the efforts of outside mediators (both 
African and European) were anything but helpful. Côte d’Ivoire, however, provides an 
example where a push for a rapid settlement essentially imposed from outside has (so far) 
failed to address or to master the fundamental dynamics of the conflict. The present civil 
war began in September 2002 with an attempt by disaffected military elements to oust 
President Laurent Gbagbo. Although failing in their first attempt to seize the capital, 
Abidjan, the rebel group which adopted the name of MPCI44 rapidly gained control of the 
Northern half of the country. It was joined by 2 other groups, the MJP and MPIGO,45 also 
seeking Gbagbo’s overthrow. Conflict deaths to date have reached many thousands and 
more than a million people have been displaced. 
 
                                                 
42 Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie and Forces Nationales de Libération, respectively. 
43 On the establishment and objectives of the African Union see the chapter by Jinmi Adisa in SIPRI 
Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, OUP summer 2003.  
44 Movement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire. 
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The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has become a 
frequent actor both in mediation and in local peace-keeping, helped to negotiate a ceasefire 
between the President and the rebels in October 2002 and despatched a force of its own 
(ECOMIC) to keep the peace. In September 2002 France, the former colonial power, took 
a hand by deploying some 1800 troops, (essentially to protect foreign residents) and 
entering the peace-making process. The personal intervention of French Foreign Minister 
Dominique de Villepin secured a power-sharing agreement between the government and at 
rebel groups at Linas-Marcoussis in France on 23 January 2003, and President Gbagbo 
appointed a new Prime Minister (Seydou Diarra) as a first step to its implementation. 
However, Gbagbo’s own following split at this point, with massive street demonstrations 
in Bujumbura to protest against sharing power with the rebels. Fighting between the 
factions resumed in March in the Western part of the country, aggravated by the 
infiltration of combatants from neighbouring Liberia. In September the rebels formally 
withdrew from the government. 
 
The problems of rebel control of growing swathes of territory, of factionalism among 
Gbagbo’s supporters, and of resentment towards French forces have not been solved but if 
anything grew worse in 2004. In November of that year France was obliged to proceed to 
an evacuation of its own and other foreign nationals, following an outbreak of serious 
rioting that was initially triggered by the death of several French soldiers as a result of 
Ivorian government military actions outside Bujumbura, and the consequent French 
retaliation. Gbagbo for his part has been accused by some of deliberately trying to play the 
‘neo-colonial’ chord and to stir up feeling against the French to mask and/or justify his 
own continuing preference for crushing the rebels by main force. 
 
Sudan is the site of one of the world’s longest-running civil wars, which entered its 20th 
year in 2003. The National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Khartoum, which is 
dominated by Northern ethnic elements and attempted to impose Islamic Shari’a law on 
the whole country in 1983, is opposed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) in the South for reasons which combine religion, autonomy, and the control of 
government and resources. The fighting up to 2004 had cost the lives of at least 50,000, 
displaced some 4 million people internally, and caused some 570,000 to take refuge in 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Efforts for mediation since 1994 have taken place mainly in the framework of the sub-
regional organization IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), 
with support from the so-called Observer Countries—the USA, UK, Norway and Italy. 
Norway has been particularly active in providing ‘good offices’ here, as in Sri Lanka. 
These efforts led to the signing of the Machakus Protocol between the government and 
rebels in July 2002, followed by further talks on the sharing of power, wealth and territory. 
An additional mediation process, under which former US President Jimmy Carter had been 
negotiating the normalization of relations between Sudan and Uganda,46 led to face-to-face 
talks between SPLM/A and government leaders which produced an apparent breakthrough 
agreement on 25 September 2003. Signed at Naivasha, Kenya, and known formally as the 
Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, this document provides 
for each side to withdraw troops from the main area controlled by the other and for both to 
contribute troops to a national army and to garrisoning certain disputed territories. A 
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leading to an agreement between the two states in Dec. 1999—was to stop each Government from abetting 
rebel elements on the other’s territory. 
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further agreement on the share-out of proceeds from the country’s oil wealth was signed in 
January 2004. 
 
The international community continued, after the signing of Naivasha, to press both sides 
for progress towards a complete settlement that would need to include solutions on 
religious matters, the disputed territories, and provision for the settlement of refugees. The 
USA played a strong card by offering to lift its national sanctions and remove Sudan from 
the list of countries sponsoring terrorism if the deal is completed.47 Hope turned to fresh 
international concern, however, when violence began to escalate from 2003 in another 
province of Sudan—Darfur. Two new armed groups with political motives, the SLM/A 
and JEM,48 began attacks on government forces in early 2003 in protest against the latter’s 
perceived failure to protect villagers from normal attacks and in defence of Darfur’s 
regional interests. Fighting extended to the whole province by April 2003, and talks 
between the SML/A rebels and the government sponsored by Chad broke down in 
December. During 2004, the scale of violence, atrocities against civilians, and refugee 
numbers escalated as a result—principally—of the actions of an Islamist militia known as 
the Janjaweed, to the point where several foreign states have called for the situation to be 
recognized as one of genocide. Current estimates speak of 70,000 dead, 1. 5 million 
persons internally displaced, and 200,000 Darfurian refugees in neighbouring Chad49.  
Direct international intervention has, however, so far been limited to a small military 
observer force sent by the African Union to monitor declared plans to disarm the 
Janjaweed; the assignment of extra troops for protection has since built up this AU 
presence to some 3,000 personnel. 
 
A key reason why the United Nations, backed by the major powers, has so far held back 
from a formal declaration of genocide or from any larger-scale intervention has been the 
concern not to let the whole Darfur situation become a gigantic ‘spoiler’ in the longer-
running search for peace between North and South. Those involved in the IGAD mediation 
argued strongly during 2004 that the completion of the Naivasha process was the key to 
proper treatment of all Sudan’s internal ethnic and governance problems in future, and that 
it would be tragically counter-productive to handle Darfur in a way that diverted or 
discouraged the Khartoum government from sticking to its related obligations. In the 
event, as a result of sustained international pressure and as the culmination of a series of 
talks and partial agreements during 2004, the Sudan authorities and the SPLM/A were 
finally able to sign a comprehensive peace agreement on 31 December. Attention now 
turns to the very demanding process of implementing the power- and resource-sharing 
arrangements it contains, and to the presence or absence of the anticipated positive spin-off 
for Darfur (where the ‘participatory’ type of settlement is generally thought to be a much 
harder prospect). 
The whole story to date provides a striking example, not just of the appalling proportions 
that violence ‘breaking out’ from an earlier peace process can assume, but also of the 
                                                 
47 The USA regards Sudan as a front-line state in the struggle against international terrorism and has in the 
past carried out reprisals, as well as sanctions, against it for it support to terrorist groups thought to include 
Al-Qaeda. 
48 The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, respectively. 
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49 Sources: Rivera, L. 'U.N. puts Darfur dead at 70,000', CNN.com; Integrated Regional 
Information Network for West Africa (IRIN-WA), 'AU says Darfur awash with weapons 
and situation a time-bomb' , IRIN Weekly Round-up 255, 11-17 Dec. 2004, 
http://www.irinnews.org. 
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extremely difficult trade-off decisions that external mediators—not just the internal 
parties—can face in the critical phases of a move towards peace. 
 
(d) Conflict and terrorism50
The phenomena of conflict and of terrorism have been closely linked throughout history. 
Their motives, and their effects on innocent bystanders, are often similar to the point of 
indistinguishability; but it is important to perceive clearly the difference in their natures. 
There can be conflict without terrorism (for instance, the major conflicts of the 1990’s in 
the Western Balkans involved it only minimally), and there can be terrorism that neither 
arises from, nor produces, armed conflict in the sense used in this study. Either or both 
sides in a ‘classic’ armed conflict can use atrocities and psychological warfare to 
‘terrorize’ their opponents, but that does not make them terrorists. The same applies in 
internal struggles, where it is safer to use the term ‘terror tactics’ for the often very serious 
violence applied ‘top-down’ by government authorities or the equivalent, in extreme cases 
amounting to official ‘genocide’. The ‘terrorist’ appellation as such is best reserved for 
individuals and movements that seek to produce an effect of terror as their principal and 
often exclusive end, by action against civilians, for motives that are ‘political’ as distinct 
from—for instance—purely criminal or financial.51
 
A large proportion of the terrorist movements still active in the world today (notably in the 
Middle East, Latin America and South/South-East Asia) have had their origin in actual 
armed conflicts, or in disputes over territory and governance of the sort that generally lie 
behind such conflicts as well. Terrorism is a typically ‘asymmetrical’ instrument (a way to 
allow a weaker party to hurt and destabilize a stronger), which makes the resort to it 
particularly tempting for conflict parties that are militarily disadvantaged, and for 
‘spoilers’ who find themselves excluded from and outlawed by a peace settlement. 
Conflict situations that are tightly controlled in terms of superficial order, and thus produce 
few or no ‘combat’ casualties, can provoke the use of terrorist methods by both local 
parties—as seen in Northern Ireland. Typically, ‘conflict-bred’ terrorists of these kinds 
restrict their attacks to the parties they are directly in conflict with—British, Spanish, 
Turkish, Sri Lankan, etc.—but there are cases in which their activities have become 
steadily diversified and internationalized, e.g. Hamas and Hizbollah in the Middle East.52 
Most recently, there has been a surge of international concern about groups that, like Al 
Qaeda, have become transnational or truly globalized, taking action on ideological 
grounds against parties that are only secondarily (or more remotely) linked with their 
original grievance.53 Up to now Al Qaeda’s type of terrorism is relatively rare, and remains 
in a minority in terms of known members and numbers of attacks54, but it represents a 
                                                 
50 This statement follows the spirit of the new definition of terrorism proposed for international use in para 
168 of the UN High Level Panel’s report (note 3 above), namely: ‘any action, in addition to actions already 
specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council 
resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, 
when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or international organization to do or do abstain from doing any act’. 
51 For more detailed discussions of this topic see Stepanova, E, ‘Anti-terrorism and peace-building during 
and after conflict’, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 2 of July 2003 at http://www.sipri.org, and Bailes, A.J.K., 
‘Terrorism and conflict’, in ‘Developing a Culture of Conflict Prevention’ ed. A, Mellbourn, published by 
the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Madariaga European Foundation for theAnna Lindh 
Programme on Conflict Prevention, Stockholm, Aug. 2004 
52 See E. Stepanova, op. cit (note 51 above). 
53 In Al Qaeda’s case this was related to foreign encroachment on the holy places of Saudi Arabia. 
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special threat in several ways—as demonstrated by its horrific attacks of 11 September 
2001 in the USA. It has been skilful in ‘infecting’ other Islamist terrorist movements, 
effectively federating them to its cause, and in recruiting new adherents world-wide. It 
makes full and skilful use of the possibilities of a globalized system of transport, 
communications and financing; and its representatives are known to have inquired into the 
possibility of using—in what would be most people’s ultimate nightmare—the 
technologies of Weapons of Mass Destruction for their attacks. 
 
The ways in which terrorists themselves can cause and aggravate conflict phenomena are 
fairly obvious. Turning asymmetry on its head, terrorist attacks can provoke their target—
if it is a militarily capable state or government—to retaliate with the use of force, often 
with results affecting much larger populations than the terrorists themselves and much 
larger territories than just their bases. This was, after all, precisely the mechanism that 
triggered the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the USA and its coalition partners in 
2002 and 2003 respectively. Terrorists striking against a state from neighbouring 
territories, even without the neighbouring government’s support, can draw retaliation 
against their bases by the target government that risks turning the conflict into an inter-
state one (a familiar syndrome, as already noted, in the Middle East and until recently in 
Latin America). There are well-documented cases of terrorist groups taking a hand in 
initially unrelated conflicts (e.g., individuals from the Arab/Islamic world enlisting on the 
side of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Balkan wars), and of terrorist elements engaged in a 
number of different conflicts assisting each other with advice, training, arms and other 
resources (e.g., the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Colombia’s FARC guerrillas). 
Where terrorist groups are mixed up with a ‘classic’ armed conflict they are typically 
among the ‘spoilers’ of peace processes; and indeed, the latter are often designed 
consciously to drive a wedge through a combatant movements between the terrorist wings 
and their more moderate allies, with whom power-sharing is most likely to work. In such 
circumstances, external peace-keeping forces may themselves come under terrorist attack 
(cf. the incidents that led to US forces’ withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980’s); and 
terrorist activity can become a major bane of post-conflict peace building efforts, as 
abundantly illustrated at present in Iraq. 
 
The ‘war on terrorism’ that the US and like-minded countries have been waging since 
September 2001 has, however, also had its effects upon the world-wide pattern of conflict, 
going much wider than just the overthrow of two régimes and the subsequent peace-
building challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is still early in historical terms to reach a 
complete and balanced view of these effects: but some aspects that seem likely to remain 
significant and that would deserve further study may be noted here. 
 
First, the strengthened international consensus against terrorism, and the willingness of the 
USA and many others to invest greater resources against it, have tempted many states or 
governments engaged in a conflict to try to re-brand their opponents as ‘terrorists’. This 
issue of nomenclature has always been a delicate one, and it was said long ago that ‘one 
main’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. Particularly since the resolution of most 
conflicts linked with de-colonization—where former leaders of guerrilla and even terrorist 
activity against the metropolitan powers could end up as respected heads of state—world 
opinion had been tending to move towards greater respect for the ‘self-determination’ 
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charting terrorist activity worldwide see Kreuger, A.B. and Laitin, D., ‘”Misunderestimating” Terrorism’, 
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motive, and less willingness to accept national sovereignty and the authority of standing 
governments as absolutes in cases of evident abuse. Branding their opponents as terrorists 
now gives embattled governments a way to redress this balance, with all the greater effect 
since new international measures entail new specific penalties for those carrying the 
terrorist label.55 Examples are Russia’s way of presenting the conflict in Chechnya (backed 
i.a. by the major terrorist outrages that were perpetrated by Chechens or their sympathizers 
in a Moscow theatre in 2003 and at Beslan in 2004); China’s attempts to get 
Islamist/ethnic rebel groups in Xinjiang added to international terrorist ‘black lists’; 
Israel’s success in maintaining the sympathy of the George W. Bush Administration in the 
USA (see above); and further cases e.g. in Uganda, Indonesia and the Philippines (the last 
two are discussed further below). 
 
Secondly, the characterizing of opponents as ‘terrorists’ has consequences, against today’s 
background of opinion, for the preferred or most likely way of ending the conflict. A 
régime that does not want to share power, grant autonomy, or reach any other kind of 
compromise with its challengers is less likely to be pressed to do so in each cases. It may 
even be criticized if it seems too ‘soft’ on terrorists, especially in circumstances where its 
actions could create undesirable precedents or repercussions for its neighbours and 
institutional partners (e.g. within the EU). More and more, the only acceptable outcome to 
such conflicts appears to be the complete defeat of (or surrender by) the challenging side. 
Although some long-standing peace efforts with high degrees of international approval—
e.g., London’s and Dublin’s plans for a power-sharing and partial autonomy-type solution 
in Northern Ireland—have gone ahead regardless of these shifting pressures, there are 
other cases in which the new dynamics do seem to have contributed to the withdrawal or 
slackening of government efforts for compromise (vide the case of Colombian already 
cited and that of Israel and the Palestinians, although the latter does not fit simply into this 
or any other mould). 
 
Thirdly, since ‘9/11’ it has become easier for governments whose opponents clearly do 
involve terrorist elements to get practical assistance against them from the USA, and 
possibly others.56 Indonesia, for example, had been in the international community’s bad 
books since the East Timor conflict of 1999, but it has rapidly rehabilitated itself in the last 
two years by branding itself as the anti-terrorist side in the long-running conflict with the 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or Free Aceh Movement) in its province of Aceh. This is a 
struggle over autonomy that has claimed at least 12,000 deaths, mostly of civilians, in the 
years since 1976. The international community had previously been engaged in an even-
handed mediation role, and managed to bring things as far as a ceasefire agreement57 
backed by an international monitoring force in December 2002. However, violence did not 
stop, the international observers were forced to withdraw, and on 19 May 2003 the 
Indonesian Government placed Aceh under martial law and began a full-out military 
campaign against the terrorists. Although the EU, USA and Japan appealed for peace 
negotiations to be revived in parallel, the US lifted its previous freeze on military aid to 
Indonesia in August 2002 and earmarked some $50 million in counter-terrorist assistance 
                                                 
55 Notably, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 Sept. 2001 (and follow-up resolution 1483) obliges 
all state and non-state actors to assist in freezing the assets of, and blocking resource flows to, terrorist 
individuals and movements. For more on this topic see the chapters by T. Biersteker and C. Norgren in 
‘Business and Security:  Public-Private Partnerships in a New Security Environment’, ed. A. Bailes and I. 
Frommelt, OUP for SIPRI, May 2004. 
56 —if they wish to. For some governments such as the Russian and Chinese, the terrorist label has been used 
for the opposite purpose, i.e. to stave off external ‘interference’. 
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for the government in the period 2002-4.  The EU also agreed to take Indonesia as one of 
its partners in a pilot study on using European resources to support local anti-terrorism 
efforts. Although any significant US arms sales to Indonesia are still subject to the 
fulfilment of conditions linked to the earlier conflict in East Timor, the Indonesian 
Government had more broadly succeeded by end-2004 in de-linking the latter experience 
from its international image and its standing vis-à-vis what it now openly called the 
‘terrorist’ challenge in Aceh. 
 
Here, again, the 26 December tsunami had a massive impact: the province of Aceh was 
among the territories closest to the epicentre of the under-sea earthquake that caused it, and 
the provincial capital of Banda Aceh was almost literally swept away.  In principle, the 
same benign consequences (in conflict terms) as were described above in the case of Sri 
Lanka should have ensued. The dynamics thus far have, however, been more complex in 
Aceh: not just because of its remoteness which would have impeded outside aid in any 
case, but because of the Indonesian armed forces’ reluctance to relinquish their grip on the 
province, the fear of each side in the conflict that the other will exploit the situation, and 
hence the fragility of the ceasefire that the GAM initially declared. Tension has also started 
to become evident between the interests and intentions of the Indonesian military on the 
one hand and the civilian-led government in Djakarta on the other. The one more definitely 
positive factor is the way that the international community’s attention has been drawn to 
the realities of the Aceh situation, making it likely that leading countries’ and institutions’ 
efforts to explore the new potential for peace-making will be not just more proactive, but 
also more nuancé in their understanding of the basic issues than before.  
 
Paralleling the earlier handling of Aceh, the Government of President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo in the Philippines has managed to get the Abu Sayyaf rebel group in the South of 
its territory—previously seen more as a criminal phenomenon focussed on extortion and 
kidnapping—classified by the USA as a ‘foreign terrorist organization’. 600 US troops 
were sent in 2002 to assist in operations against the group, and in May 2003 the Bush 
Administration committed more than $114 million in military aid to assist counter-terrorist 
activities in the Philippines. The Philippines Government has since also classified the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military wing the NPA as terrorists, and 
has effectively broken off any kind of peace process with them. One the other hand, it 
succeeded in driving a further group—the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)—to the 
negotiating table by threatening to brand them as terrorists if they did not forswear 
violence. In this case the MILF complied, and an agreement opening the way for 
substantial peace talks (with monitoring assistance from Malaysia) was duly signed on 18 
July 2003. 
 
Fourthly, and as this last story illustrates, the new implications of the terrorist ‘label’ tend 
to polarize the options available to insurgent movements themselves. Some have been 
moved to abjure terrorism and to seek international respectability by all other possible 
means (e.g., unilaterally committing themselves to respect the laws of warfare and 
humanitarian restrictions on weaponry).58 In almost all conceivable circumstances this is a 
good thing for the cause of peace. However, other movements may make the contrary 
choice, stiffening their resistance and perhaps resorting more wholeheartedly to terrorist 
tactics, as well as invoking help from other terrorists or terrorist-friendly governments 
outside. There is evidence of this trend among the more extreme players in Afghanistan, 
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Chechnya, Iraq, and in the new strides made by the Maoist rebels in Nepal in addition to 
the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines already mentioned. Combined with the relevant 
government’s new access to outside aid, there is a clear risk that such developments will 
move the conflicts in question further away from, not nearer to, a solution - with the 
civilian populations (as usual) as the main losers. 
 
Last but not least, military actions undertaken to overthrow ‘rogue’ régimes—on the 
grounds i.a. of their supposed terror-friendliness—can create particularly tough post-
conflict environments opening up new possible fronts for terrorism. To be fair, the 
problem in these cases arises not only from the possible mistakes made by external actors 
attempting reconstruction and democracy-building, but from the depths which such 
societies have previously plumbed in terms of bad governance, corruption, and unresolved 
internal (ethnic, provincial, religious, etc) contradictions. The result in any case may be an 
extended period of ‘not-conflict, not-peace’ in which the inadequate grip, and perhaps 
questionable legitimacy, of the intervening authorities creates the classic ‘authority gap’ 
that is most likely to give rise to terrorism. Iraq is, unfortunately, now providing a model 
case of this, but there are signs of the same syndrome in the continued operations of Al 
Qaeda and their allies in Afghanistan and neighbouring parts of Pakistan. These situations 
create a double challenge: for external peace-keeping forces who have to become expert in 
‘counter-insurgency’ techniques as well as the (possibly even more alien) disciplines of 
peace- and nation-building; and for these forces together with the nascent local authorities, 
in creating a self-sustaining new order that will be capable of suppressing the terrorists 
without oppressing the whole population (something that even the most developed 
Western states do not find easy). 
 
IV. International ‘Peace Missions’ 
This last topic provides a natural transition to the final one in this paper: the pattern and 
evolution of international conflict management efforts in the form of military, non-military 
or combined interventions. Data on multilateral deployments for this purpose since 1993 
are set out in Table 4. One of the first things they make clear is that there is no one-on-one 
correspondence between deadly conflicts and international responses. Neither the UN nor 
anyone else has the resources to intervene in all conflicts and even if the resources were 
there, the necessary international consensus to produce universally supported (or tolerated) 
actions would not be forthcoming in all cases.59 Though the topic is too large to be done 
justice to here, it may generally be said that the pattern of intervention has been dictated 
more by outside actors’ own strategic priorities, policies and perceptions (in turn strongly 
influenced, i.a., by media and NGO reporting) than it has by the inherent gravity of 
conflicts or the degree of human suffering involved. Some of the longest-running and most 
bloody conflicts have, to date, seen no external military intervention at all: for example 
Myanmar, Colombia, and Sudan up to 2004. 
 
The issues arising from the changing pattern of international missions and their 
experiences are manifold, but for reasons of space just three aspects will be touched on 
here60: the demand for an increasingly multi-functional and ‘full-cycle’ approach to 
conflict management and peace building; the changing pattern of intervention sequences 
                                                 
59 The Darfur conflict in Sudan provided a particularly controversial instance of this in 2004, see section III 
(c) above.. 
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and burden-sharing among different international actors; and the increasingly recognized 
importance of post-conflict justice.61  
 
Table 4. Number of multilateral peace missions  
Year 1993 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total nr of multilateral missions 34 52 55 51 48 52 
Number of new missions 9 11 3 5 4 14 
Missions carried out by:       
   United Nations 20 23 22 18 19 19 
   OSCE 5 12 12 13 11 10 
   NATO – 1 2 4 4 4 
   EUa 1 1 3 3 1 5 
   CIS 3 4 4 3 3 3 
   Other regional organizationsb 1 4 5 3 3 4 
   Non-standing coalitionsc 4 7 7 7 7 8 
a Includes missions led by WEU. 
a For example: AU, ECOWAS, CEMAC, OAS. 
c Includes missions that are directly tasked and authorized by the UN, but are carried out 
by an ad hoc coalition of states. 
 
Sources: SIPRI Yearbooks 1994, 1998, 2001–2004 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1994–2004). 
Missions carried out by: 
 
Peace making in the round 
Even before the end of the 20th century, harsh experience in the Western Balkans and 
Africa had brought home to international policymakers and analysts alike that in conflict 
management, getting a sufficient grip on the situation to stop the violence is only the first 
point in the battle. Without a political settlement that addresses the issues at the source of 
the dispute, conflict could break out again as soon as the intervener’s hand is lifted. 
Without active efforts to mend whatever was broken or missing in a previously ‘weak’, 
and/or abusively governed, state, human rights and the proper political, economic and 
international functioning of the successor régime cannot be guaranteed—whether or not it 
actually falls back into violence and terrorism. Solving these challenges is now 
increasingly seen, not just as a humanitarian duty of the interveners (when they choose to 
intervene at all), but as a matter of enlightened self-interest for the international 
community. Given the increasingly transnational or globalized nature of many dimensions 
of security—notably the fight against terrorism, proliferation, disease, climate change and 
environmental decay—the international family needs to know that a post-conflict state is 
functioning properly on the inside, not just refraining from making trouble externally. 
Moreover, botched peace-keeping almost always means either the prolongation of conflict 
(as discussed above) or a periodic relapse into it. Some of these cases have in the past led 
to enormously lengthy international peace-keeping missions (e.g. UNFICYP in Cyprus), 
which not only constitute a permanent reminder of the world community’s failure to finish 
what it started, but eat up all-too-scarce resources that might be better employed for new 
preventive or rapid-reaction deployments. 
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61 This choice of topics is not intended to side-line or belittle the question of the conditions for intervention: 
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the report of the UN High Level Panel (note 3 above) which lays out five basic criteria of legitimacy for 
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force as an ultima ratio, proportionality of the means used, and the likely balance of consequences 
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Reflection on these factors has led analysts increasingly to see conflict as a cyclical or 
recidivist process, in which good peace-building after a conflict should be viewed as one 
of the best and most tangible routes to conflict prevention. Ideally, this effect could operate 
not only in the affected state itself but in the whole region, by turning the post-conflict 
régime into a model of good governance and responsible international conduct that can 
both be supported by, and have benign osmotic effects upon, its neighbours. In the best 
case the former problem state can quickly be promoted to a supplier, itself, of international 
peacekeeping forces.62 This full-cycle philosophy was most notably and recently reflected 
in the recommendation by the UN High Level Panel (December 2004) to establish a UN 
Peace Building Commission able to support problem states in both pre-conflict and post-
conflict conditions.63
 
The obvious corollary is that the international community’s inputs must be much more 
than just military, and must be sustained well beyond any formalistic ‘end-date’ linked, for 
example, to entry into force of a political agreement or cease-fire, or the holding of new 
elections. In the past, the international community has generally managed to see the need 
for follow-on engagement in the economic, development assistance, and humanitarian 
assistance fields: the problem has been rather with the failure to draw the scope of these 
programmes generously enough, or to stick to the promises made over on adequate 
period.64 Most new thinking about international roles (both in peace operations and post-
conflict support) has, therefore, gone into the fields of governance that lie somewhere 
between military security and economics: the reform of the security section in a broader 
sense (including both measures of demilitarization/disarmament and positive measures to 
establish adequate anti-terrorist, border control, export control, arms control etc. systems); 
direct support (operational and/or through training) for the maintenance of internal order 
and security; the building of structures of law and justice, and of central and local 
administration in general; measures to remedy social injustices linked with gender, 
religion, ethnic identity etc and to guarantee adequate political participation and the 
protection of equal opportunities for the future; and several more. An increasing number of 
international missions have in recent years been designed to operate in these parts of the 
spectrum: notably UN missions like UNMA in Angola, UNAMA in Afghanistan and 
UNMISET in East Timor, and various functional missions launched by the European 
Union (police missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, FYROM, and the EUROJUST THEMIS advisory mission on law and order in 
Georgia). Missions launched under the mandate of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have, in practice, always been of this non-military kind, 
geared most often towards conflict prevention through the peaceful resolution of disputes 
and the observance of political standards and civil (including minority) rights. 
 
The consequences of not paying proper attention to these aspects of peace-building, or of 
tackling them with the wrong implements and models and inadequate legitimacy, have 
been all too painfully obvious in Iraq. However, even the best-conceived missions of this 
kind have serious challenges to face. One is that of procuring the right human resources, 
since it is only very recently that police capacities have started to be identified and 
                                                 
62 This sequence has been seen, notably, in the Western Balkans where countries like Croatia and Serbia-
Montenegro are now keen to contribute to NATO- or EU-led peace missions (as part of their drive for 
eventual full NATO and EU membership). Over the longer term it has also operated in Africa. 
63 See paras. 228 and 261-9 of the UN High Level Panel report, as in notes 3 and 54 above. 
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prepared on the analogy of military ones for such international uses, and even more 
recently that thought has been given to other civilian functions.65 Another great challenge 
is coordination and the achievement of synergy, not just between different human 
contingents operating in the field—and it is difficult enough for soldiers, police, aid 
workers and NGOs from a variety of nations to work harmoniously!66—but between the 
different branches of international peace-building and reconstruction policy. The need is 
increasingly recognized, for example, for programmes of Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR) following a conflict in which military forces have become 
inflated (i.a. by unwilling recruits and possibly child soldiers): but these will not have the 
desired effect on overall security unless properly coordinated with overall economic 
reconstruction and development strategies and—if needed—with the positive re-shaping 
and modernization of national defence and security forces. (Reflection on this has become 
linked with a very interesting broader debate on the relationship between defence, 
disarmament and development in international security). Last but not least, the paradox of 
international involvement in such intimate aspects of the re-shaping of a given society, 
nation and state apparatus is that it works best when it most quickly does away with the 
need for such interference. The military practicalities of stopping conflicts do not vary 
greatly, but the pre-conditions for viable and stable new régimes do, according to region 
and culture, degree of development, and many other internal and environmental features. 
The more local actors can be drawn into the process to express their own preferences and 
take their own responsibilities from the beginning, the better, and in this sense a hard-
headed and well-phased ‘exit strategy’ is just as vital for peace-building missions as for the 
more traditional military kind. 
 
Patterns of intervention 
The first thing that stands out from Table 4 is the continued supremacy of the United 
Nations in the peace-keeping business, if assessed globally—carrying out around two-
fifths of all international missions under its own direct authority, and providing some 
degree of mandate for most of the others. Despite all the criticism and scepticism in 
levelled against the Organization notably by the USA after 9/11, the UN has continued to 
launch new missions with wide international support and in 2003, was deploying an 
average of over 38,500 peace-keepers in the field.67 Even in the case of Iraq, after the 
political furore caused by the breakdown of efforts in early 2003 to secure a UN mandate 
for military action and the subsequent non-mandated invasion by a US-led coalition, the 
coalition partners rapidly had to turn back to the UN to find legally effective solutions for 
issues like Iraqi debt and the lifting of sanctions. (Many would say that the work of the UN 
                                                 
65 Dwan, R., ‘Civilian tasks and capabilities in EU operations’ paper presented at an Expert 
Seminar on ’Towards a Global Security Policy for Europe: Tasks and capabilities’ Berlin 
18-19 May 2004 .  See also ‘A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Report of the Study 
Group on Europe's Security Capabilities’, published on 15 Sep. 2004 at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/#Recent%20contributions%20by%20our%20staff. A 
good direction for international work and study in the future would be to consider building 
non-military intervention capacities for cooperative use in non-European regions, such as 
Africa. 
66 For a succinct account of this debate (with further references) see Holmqvist C., ‘Private Security 
Companies - the case for regulation’, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 9 of Jan. 2005, available at 
http://www.sipri.org. 
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disarmament and monitoring missions in Iraq, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, was vindicated 
when it turned out that Saddam Hussein had not actually been holding any WMD). Peace-
building efforts in Iraq have suffered from the lack precisely of those well-honed and 
specialised services that the UN and its agencies can provide, and the US has found itself 
in the position of pressing for the UN to play a greater role—analogous to that in 
Afghanistan—while the UN holds back inter alia because of coalition forces’ inability to 
guarantee an adequate level of security. There could be no clearer illustration that ‘going 
private’ with conflict management very, very rarely works. 
 
At the same time, another striking trend of the last years has been towards new forms of 
complementarity and burden-sharing between the UN and other capacity providers, both in 
‘horizontal’ and in ‘serial’ terms. ‘Horizontal’ burden-sharing occurs when a UN mission 
and another presence exist side by side with different functional responsibilities: this has 
been the case for a while in Kosovo (UN civil administration and NATO military forces), 
and now happens (for instance) between the UN and a NATO-led force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, and the UN presence (MINUCI) together with ECOWAS and French forces 
in Côte d’Ivoire. The UN mission (MONUC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) was supplemented for a while in 2003 by the EU-led Operation Artemis, sent to 
control a threat of breakdown of order in the Bunia region. However, it is more typical for 
institutions to succeed each other serially over time, usually as the required capacity 
‘softens’ in nature from operational military peacekeeping to monitoring, re-training and 
reconstruction. What is interesting is that, especially recently, there does not seem to be 
any fixed order to these hand-overs. Sometimes regional institutions have looked after the 
‘tough’ phase of the operation before the UN took over, or brought their efforts under a 
wider framework—Liberia, DRC, Burundi. In one well-known case, NATO took over 
when the UN approach proved incapable or inappropriate to deal with a deteriorating 
military situation (the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Former Yugoslavia). 
However, there have also been cases when the UN has presided during the immediate 
conflict resolution on post-conflict period, to be succeeded by local organizations 
possessing the models and resources for more thoroughgoing reconstruction (like the EU 
in the Western Balkans). The only process that seems to be unidirectional is when the 
‘hard’ phase of an action is taken on by a self-appointed coalition, and the UN may or may 
not choose to legitimise and take responsibility for the subsequent phases—as in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, but also various African instances. 
 
The variety of such intervention sequences also reflects the diversity of partners now 
available. Since 2001 both NATO and the European Union have developed their policies 
and capabilities to the point where they can offer, in principle, to contribute to 
interventions anywhere around the globe. NATO’s coming-of-age in this respect was 
marked by its take-over of responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003, following a period in which individual NATO 
countries had succeeded each other in command of the force with back-stage NATO 
assistance.68 The EU, as already noted, carried out a brief ‘autonomous’69 intervention in 
the DRC from July 2003, and its new Security Strategy (adopted by the European Council 
in December 2003) spells out the rationale for such global activism: ‘With the new threats, 
                                                 
68 At the time of writing NATO has also taken on certain military re-training tasks in Iraq, but not with any 
direct operational component (and with some nations declining to take an active part at least inside Iraq). 
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the first line of defence will often be abroad’.70 Both organizations have shown themselves 
able in practice to work (horizontally and serially) with the UN, but the EU has especially 
stressed its wish to put its operational services at the disposal of the latter, and signed a 
Joint Declaration with the UN to that effect in September 2003.71
 
The EU has also shown an interest in supporting, and operationally supplementing, 
African regional peace-keeping efforts,72 and this leads to the last point to be made in this 
section. There has been a striking growth in the ambition, and practical efforts, of African 
regional and sub-regional organizations to provide primary peacekeeping services for 
conflicts on their own continent during the past decade. In 1994, of 11 peace operations in 
Africa, 8 were carried out directly by the UN and 3 by local organizations; in 1998 the 
balance tipped to 4 UN-led and 7 local-led missions; and in 2003 there were 6 of each. 
Earlier operations were dominated by the West African group ECOWAS, which was 
sometimes open to the charge of being dominated by Nigerian national interests, but in the 
last couple of years there has been less room for such concerns as ECOWAS has been 
more careful to seek appropriate UN mandates and the pan-regional African Union has 
also emerged as a (highly norm-conscious) framework for such actions73. The main 
challenges facing these African forces are now of a resource nature, including the need for 
higher and better harmonized standards of personnel and equipment.74 Even so, the 
continent is well ahead of any other in its degree of self-sufficiency in this regard. 
Countries like India and Pakistan make massive personnel contributions to UN-led 
peacekeeping missions, but their region has no truly functional local cooperation 
framework of its own, while other regional organizations like ASEAN (South-East Asia) 
or the Organization of American States et al in Latin America are only gradually tip-toeing 
towards a degree of ‘securitization’ where joint operations might come into question. 
Elsewhere, recent ‘multilateral’ peace-keeping missions have in reality been ad hoc 
coalitions led by a single country: this was true of the Australian-led operations in the 
Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, and true in effect of various ‘Commonwealth of 
Independent States’ (CIS) missions in the area of the former Soviet Union that were 
initiated and dominated by Russia. While attracting far less international attention, these 
last examples are intrinsically open to the same questions of legitimacy and answerability 
that have been debated ad nauseam in the case of Iraq. 
 
Post-conflict justice in peace building and conflict prevention 
Over the past decade there has been an increased focus on the issue of transitional justice, 
particularly in the post-conflict setting. Confronted by atrocities committed during the 
armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the United Nations Security 
Council responded by authorizing the creation of two international ad hoc tribunals (the 
ICTR and ICTY respectively) to deal with gross violations of international humanitarian 
law. The 1990s also saw several repressive dictatorships giving way to more democratic 
                                                 
70 See note 2 above. 
71 The remaining European security organization, the OSCE, has not yet mandated any military operations 
and has no evident competence to do so outside the European area: but it has worked with the UN in the 
Western Balkans, notably in Kosovo (UNMIK).  
72 The EU agreed to give financial help to African peacekeeping in July 2003 and has set up a standing 
‘Peace Facility’ for this purpose. Another international support programme has been promised by the G8, 
which will return to the topic at its Gleneagles Summit in 2005. 
73 The same trends have been reflected in recent missions undertaken by groups of Central African and South 
African countries; for details see Dwan and Wiharta, as in note 60 above. 
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regimes in Central-Eastern Europe, South America and South Africa 75,, where experience 
again underlined that the adequate review and punishment of past injustices can be one key 
to a successful transition. 
 
Injustice is often conceived as a consequence of conflict, but more often than not it is also 
a symptom and cause. Injustice may take several forms, notably: a) the structural and 
systemic, for instance, the political, social and economic marginalization of certain groups 
or individuals compounded by the absence, or corruption, of the rule of law; and b) 
injustice inflicted on individuals in times of conflict through the committing of atrocity 
crimes.76 Thus, justice is perceived to have been done only when ethnic discrimination, 
unequal access to resources, and abuse of power can be addressed in a legitimate and fair 
manner. This has led to a growing consensus within the international community that the 
delivery of justice and accountability is integral to peace and stability. As espoused by UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his recent report on ‘The rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’, “Justice and peace are not contradictory 
forces…The question, then, can never be whether to pursue justice and accountability, but 
rather when and how.” The extent to which the international community has embraced this 
emerging norm is reflected in the presence of a nascent system of international justice––
consisting of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), ad-hoc international 
criminal tribunals, ‘hybrid courts’, national courts, and truth and reconciliation 
commissions––all of which convey a promise to end the offenders’ impunity. Equally 
important is the understanding that international courts represent just one element in, and 
need to be balanced and coordinated with, a wider range of instruments for conflict 
prevention and for post-conflict (or post-régime change) stabilization. Deterrence is also 
part of the rationale behind the setting up of such mechanisms. 
 
Perhaps one of the most singular developments in the sphere of post-conflict justice has 
been the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The idea of creating such 
a court took root after the end of the World War II, but only began to assume concrete 
form at the end of the Cold War, and was finally crystallized on 1 July 2002 with the entry 
into force of the Rome Statute.77 The ICC has jurisdiction only over individuals, may not 
try governments, and can claim jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, genocide, war 
crimes and crimes of aggression only if certain conditions have been met. The act under 
investigation must have occurred on the territory of a state party to the Rome Statute, or 
the accused must be a national of a state party; one or more of the parties involved must be 
a state party; or a non-state party must have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. Under the 
principle of complementarity, the responsible state has the duty to prosecute in the first 
instance. Only in circumstances where the national court is unable or unwilling to try the 
case will it proceed to the ICC. In situations where non-state parties are involved, the case 
                                                 
75 This occurred in, e.g., Argentina, El Salvador and South Africa. For a discussion of transitional justice see 
Kritz, N. J. (ed.), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. 2, 
Country Studies (United States Institute of Peace: Washington, DC, 1995). 
76 The term atrocity crimes is used here to cover war crimes, crimes against humanity, the crime of genocide 
and crimes of aggression.  
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will only fall under ICC jurisdiction if the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, decides to refer a situation to the Prosecutor. Finally, the ICC has no 
retroactive power and can only try crimes that have been committed after the statute 
entered into force on 1 July 2002.78  
 
At the time of writing the ICC, although fully operational since 2003, has yet to hear any 
cases. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is at present conducting investigations on 
atrocity crimes allegedly committed in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and in Northern Uganda; and in January 2005, the situation concerning the internal 
conflict in Central African Republic was also  referred to the OTP. However, the progress 
of the ICC has been beset by continued opposition, particularly from the United States, 
which has maintained its policy of pursuing Bilateral Immunity Agreements with states 
parties and non-states parties alike (ensuring that they will not refer cases involving US 
citizens or employees to the Court), and in other respects continuing to implement the 
American Service Members’ Protection Act. 
 
In view of the constraints on the ICC and in particular of the ICC’s forward temporal 
jurisdiction (rendering it unable to address crimes that occurred prior to 1 July 2002), 
alternative mechanisms have had to be found to bring those guilty of grave war crimes to 
account. More generally, too, the hard-learned lessons drawn from the ICTR and the ICTY 
have added new dimensions to the debate on post-conflict justice. It can now be seen that 
too often, the emphasis has been on foreign experts, foreign models and foreign-conceived 
solutions. There is an increasing understanding that in any aspect of post-conflict peace-
building, and in the case of post-conflict justice above all, local ownership is paramount 
for the viability, legitimacy and sustainability of the process. Hence, any mechanism 
employed to address past injustices must carefully consider the nature of the existing legal 
system, the particular requirement and demand for law and justice, and most important of 
all, the traditions and values of the country in question - while still upholding international 
legal requirements. In concrete terms, the approach taken to incorporate these lessons has 
been to establish various ‘hybrid’ courts, which are part international and part national. 
Hybrid courts combine international laws of accountability with local norms of justice. 
The motive for developing this model has, however, reflected other considerations as well: 
notably the recognition that the long-drawn-out procedures and steep costs typified by the 
ICTR and the ICTY have risked sapping the political will and also the readiness to provide 
funds for post-conflict justice. The limited mandates and relatively low budgets of hybrid 
courts are an attempt to address this problem. Lastly, the hybrid model promises to be less 
politically-charged than the ICTR and the ICTY: the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia (the first major experiments with this approach) 
are treaty-based organizations and fall outside of UN Security Council authority. 
 
Within this model, a distinction can be made between the international–domestic and the 
domestic-international type of court. The former refers to an international body with 
domestic elements, of which the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), located in 
Freetown, is a prime example. The SCSL assumed its functions on 1 July 2002, is 
composed of both international and local judges, and applies international and domestic 
criminal law. The other type of  hybrid court is one where international elements have been 
‘grafted onto’ the domestic legal system. In March 2003, the UN and the Cambodian 
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Government came to an agreement on the terms of the creation of the Extraordinary 
Chambers to address war crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge regime.79 The only 
remaining stumbling block to this Phnom-Penh based court is its financial viability––it is 
thus far financed entirely from voluntary contributions from UN member states. Although 
a controversial case, the Iraqi Special Tribunal, established by the Iraqi Governing Council 
on 10 December 2003 can also be loosely classified as a hybrid court. International 
involvement in it, where it occurs, comes through the use of advisers, observers and 
specially appointed judges. However, the internationally appointed advisers have little 
authority within this tribunal’s framework and it is not clear to whom the former would 
report if it became evident that the tribunal was not following international standards. The 
organization of the Iraqi Special Tribunal thus raises many questions,80 and many in the 
human rights community are sceptical that it will be able to hold fair trials, given its 
predominantly domestic nature.81 The establishment of the Iraqi Special Tribunal could, 
indeed, arguably be seen as a reversion to a system based on ‘victors’ justice’, which is 
exactly what the international community has recently been striving to move away from.82
 
The hybrid model (regardless of type) does help to underscore that, more often than not, 
there is a lack of a functioning judicial system in post-conflict states. Court systems may 
have collapsed, or may be corrupt and subject to political manipulation. The model is an 
attempt to address this gap through the infusion of international expertise, but with the aim 
of strengthening domestic capacity in the judicial sector of the country in question. 
Moreover, the international presence gives the court greater legitimacy and objectivity for 
both the accused and the victims; and it can serve to attract extra funding. It is far too early 
to assess whether the hybrid model is the ideal one, but for now it is seen as the most 
efficient prospect for timely delivery of post-conflict justice. 
 
To judge from the various formal legal mechanisms now in place, there seems to be a 
strengthening consensus among policy makers and academics that the delivery of justice is 
important for sustainable peace-building. However, there is still a debate about how, and in 
what form, justice should be administered: and questions hanging over the extent to which 
justice is pursued. The limited mandate of the hybrid models, and the decision by the ICC 
to target only those bearing the greatest responsibility, are a reflection of the de facto limits 
to the international community’s commitment to justice. They also provoke the question 
whether, in its haste to complete as many trials as visibly as possible and to fulfil the 
mandates of the international courts, the international community may be doing itself a 
disservice. Plea bargains can make victims feel that justice is not being served; and the 
severity of the crimes committed may not be recognized by the relatively light sentences 
passed. Furthermore, if only the top leaders are prosecuted, ordinary citizens do not always 
feel that their grievances have been adequately addressed. A key point of contention at 
present is precisely that the existing models have not matched the actual expectations and 
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needs of the victims On the other hand, it could be argued that absolute justice, involving 
total and maximum punishment of all perpetrators of atrocities crimes and grave human 
rights abuses, is not always necessary or even conducive for successful peace-building. 
Such an absolutist approach to the issues of truth and accountability can be destabilizing, 
and may prolong and even obstruct the transition to and consolidation of democracy and 
peace in the short-term.83 There is therefore an obvious need for other processes to 
complement and supplement the internationally led process of judicial retribution. This can 
be done through mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions, which function 
as tools of reparative justice, and local judicial processes – both of which are often more 
victim-oriented. Truth and reconciliation commissions offer the opportunity for a rigorous 
accounting of the past, which is important to restore the dignity of the victims, and allow 
victims and perpetrators alike a chance to heal and move forward with their lives. The 
recent experiments with different models of judicial mechanisms illustrate a movement 
towards a more holistic and interwoven approach to justice which more effectively closes 
the ‘impunity gap’. 
 
In addition to a multi-tiered approach of retributive justice, post-conflict justice must help 
to lay foundations for avoiding future injustice and conflict through the reform and 
strengthening of the rule of law. Lastly, the concept of post-conflict justice also needs to be 
expanded beyond retributive justice to include social and economic aspects.84  
 
The financial viability of post-conflict justice is an important practical issue to address. 
The international community, particularly a select group of states, has by now spent well 
over $1 billion on international courts. With so many international courts now in place, the 
question arises of the financial sustainability of maintaining this commitment. Nor is 
further devolution to the local level always a solution because, in territories like Bosnia 
and Herzegovina where wide areas of administration are still the responsibility of the 
international community, the costs will still fall to the latter.  There is thus more than 
enough fuel for a continuing debate about how to strike the delicate balance between 
resource constraints on the one side, and on the other a symbolically and psychologically 
adequate provision of justice that ensures optimal and appropriate levels of punishment.  
 
Last words 
The complexity of the modern challenge of conflict, as reflected in all the above sections, 
itself rules out anything that could be described as a ‘conclusion’.  All recent experience 
and analytical advances underline the need to see conflict not in isolation but as one 
symptom of more general dysfunctions both in security and governance, within and 
between states and in the global community. All the evidence points to the need to 
approach any form of ‘treatment’ of conflict – prevention, containment, management or 
conclusion and re-building –in a holistic, multi-dimensional and multi-functional way. 
 
Some last thoughts may, however, be added regarding the bigger picture. Historically, we 
are living in a period of declining quantity of conflict linked with important (and 
sometimes alarming) proportional shifts in its nature or ‘quality’. Since the end of the cold 
war in particular, successive trends in security discourse have tried to provide the one 
illuminating insight and one set of weapons that might bring the remaining problems under 
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control: conflict as an ethnic deconstruction of the state, conflict as a ‘weak state’ 
symptom more generally, and now, conflict as a trigger or manifestation of ‘new’ and 
‘asymmetrical’ threats.  None of these approaches has yet provided the ‘silver bullet’ that 
was hoped for.  They all neglect one point that emerges much more compellingly from the 
statistical study: namely, the disproportionate amount of suffering, and of danger to the 
general international security order, that emanates from a relatively limited number of very 
stubborn, long-term, and protean conflicts – the most obvious example being in the Middle 
East. These are, as it were, the sharp point of the gradually narrowing thrust of armed 
conflict world-wide. As such, they should logically demand a greater effort from the world 
community both in terms of analysis and resources, leading to new and more inventive 
attempts at solutions (which in these cases above all, would have to be individually 
custom-made).  Such a fresh look at the issue might also bring a much-needed sharpening 
of focus to policy discussions on conflict prevention.  Rather than taking the way of least 
resistance which is to try to prevent the causes of the last conflicts we are familiar with (as 
military planners constantly re-fight the last war), we could aim, on the one hand, to look 
at instruments specifically suited to tackle the challenge of recidivism; and on the other, to 
stretch our imaginations and plans to cover new drivers of conflict (environmental, 
biological/demographic, infrastructure and cyber-related, etc etc) that could before too 
long replace the latest ‘new threats’ in a constantly evolving globalized society. 
